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1. Introduction 
By now there is widespread agreement that trade liberalization enhances growth. No such agreement exists, however, on the 
growth-enhancing effects of financial liberalization, in large part because it is associated with risky capital flows, lending 
booms, and crises. The Mexican experience is often considered a prime example of what can go wrong with liberalization. 
Mexico liberalized its trade and finance and entered the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), yet despite these 
reforms and the advantage of proximity to the United States, Mexico’s growth performance has been unremarkable in 
comparison with that of its peers. A particularly worrisome development is that, since 2001, Mexico’s exports have stopped 
growing. 
That financial liberalization is bad for growth because it leads to crises is the wrong lesson to draw. Our empirical 
analysis shows that, in countries with severe credit market imperfections, financial liberalization leads to more rapid growth, 
but also to a higher incidence of crises. In fact, most of the fastest-growing countries of the developing world have experienced 
boom-bust cycles. We argue that liberalization leads to faster growth because it eases financial constraints, but that this occurs 
only if agents take on credit risk, which makes the economy fragile and prone to crisis. An implication of our analysis is that the 
international bank flows that follow financial liberalization and increase financial fragility are an important component of a 
rapid-growth path. 
We also find that asymmetries between the tradables (T) and nontradables (N) sectors are key to understanding 
the links among liberalization and growth, boom-bust cycles, and the Mexican experience. Asymmetric sectoral responses to 
liberalization and crisis are the norm. 
At first glance, the experience of Mexico, a prominent liberalizer, challenges the argument that liberalization 
promotes growth. However, when we compare Mexico against an international norm, we find that the growth in Mexico’s 
exports during the 1990s was outstanding. We also find that, although its pattern of boom and crisis is similar to that of the 
average liberalizing country, Mexico’s credit crunch in the wake of its crisis has been atypically severe and long-lasting.  This 
credit crunch, together with a lack of structural reform since 1995, has resulted in stagnation of the N-sector, generating 
bottlenecks that have contributed to Mexico’s less-than-stellar growth performance and to the more recent fall in exports. 
To document these points, we analyze the empirical relationship among liberalization, crises, and growth across 
the set of countries with active financial markets, and we characterize the typical boom-bust cycle. To substantiate our 
interpretation of the data and to explain the Mexican experience, we present a model that establishes a causal link from 
liberalization to growth, and in which the same forces that lead to faster growth also generate financial fragility. The model 
leads us to divide our data set into countries with high and intermediate degrees of contract enforceability (which we call high-
enforceability and medium-enforceability countries, or HECs and MECs, respectively).  
Our data analysis shows that, across MECs, trade liberalization has typically been followed by financial 
liberalization, which has led to financial fragility and to occasional crises. On average, however, both trade and financial 
liberalization have led to more rapid long-run growth in GDP per capita across the set of countries with active financial 
markets. Furthermore, we find that this positive link is not generated by a few fast-growing countries that experienced no crisis. 
Instead, it is typically the fastest-growing countries that have experienced crises. This suggests that the same mechanism that 
links liberalization with growth in MECs also generates, as a by-product, financial fragility and occasional crises.  
These facts do not contradict the negative link between growth and the variance of several macroeconomic 
variables—the typical measure of volatility in the literature.  A high variance reflects not only the uneven progress, or 
“bumpiness,” associated with occasional crises, but also high-frequency shocks. Instead we measure the incidence of occasional   3
crises by the (negative) skewness of real credit growth. Our findings show that fast-growing MECs tend to have negatively 
skewed credit growth paths. 
Our explanation for the links among liberalization, bumpiness, and growth is based on the fact that countries like 
Mexico have severe contract enforceability problems. Because liberalization has not been accompanied by judicial reform, 
these problems have persisted. The key point is that these problems affect firms asymmetrically: whereas many T-sector firms 
can overcome these problems by accessing international capital markets, most N-sector firms cannot. Thus N-sector firms are 
financially constrained and depend on domestic bank credit. Using microlevel data from the Mexican economic census and 
from firms listed on the stock market, we document this asymmetry for the case of Mexico. 
Trade liberalization increases GDP growth by promoting T-sector productivity. Financial liberalization adds even 
more to GDP growth by accelerating financial deepening and thus increasing the investment of financially constrained firms, 
most of which are in the N-sector. However, the easing of financial constraints is associated with the undertaking of credit risk, 
which often takes the form of foreign currency–denominated debt backed by N-sector output. Credit risk arises because 
financial liberalization not only lifts restrictions that preclude risk taking, but also is associated with explicit and implicit 
systemic bailout guarantees that cover creditors against systemic crises.
1 Not surprisingly, an important share of capital inflows 
takes the form of risky bank flows, and the economy as a whole experiences aggregate fragility and occasional crises. 
Rapid N-sector growth helps the T-sector grow faster by providing abundant and cheap inputs. Thus, as long as a 
crisis does not occur, growth in a risky economy is more rapid than in a safe one. Of course, financial fragility implies that a 
self-fulfilling crisis may occur. And, during a crisis, GDP growth falls and typically turns negative. Crises must be rare, 
however, in order to occur in equilibrium—otherwise agents would not find it profitable to take on credit risk in the first place. 
Thus average long-run growth may be faster along a risky path than along a safe one. Our model follows this intuition to 
establish a causal link from liberalization to GDP growth. This link is independent of the nominal exchange rate regime. 
The argument imposes restrictions on the behavior of credit and of the N-to-T output ratio that help us identify the 
mechanism. First, credit growth and the N-to-T output ratio should fall drastically in the wake of crisis, and because crises are 
infrequent, they should exhibit a negatively skewed distribution. Second, during normal times the N-to-T output ratio should 
vary with credit. Finally, the N-to-T output ratio should decrease following trade liberalization and increase following financial 
liberalization. We show that the bumpiness of credit growth and these asymmetric sectoral responses are indeed an empirical 
regularity across MECs. We are not aware of other theoretical arguments that relate the N-to-T output ratio to liberalization, 
growth, and crises and that explains the empirical regularities we have found. 
As we noted previously, relative to its initial GDP, Mexico’s growth has been decent but not stellar. However, 
when we control for bumpiness, Mexico is an underperformer. Even in the period since liberalization, the Mexican economy 
has grown 2 percentage points less per year than the average for other countries with comparably risky paths. When we 
compare Mexico’s boom-bust cycle with that of the typical MEC, we find that Mexico’s boom phase and subsequent crisis are 
typical; it is Mexico’s response to the crisis that is the outlier. Relative to the typical MEC, Mexico’s credit crunch was both 
more severe and more protracted. The credit-to-GDP ratio in Mexico fell from 49 percent in 1994 to 17 percent in 2002. 
This severe credit crunch is in contrast to the fast recovery of GDP growth in the wake of the tequila crisis of 
1994-95. GDP growth can mask a sharp sectoral asymmetry between an impressive increase in exports and a lagging N-sector. 
                                                 
1 We distinguish two types of bailout guarantees: unconditional and systemic. The former are granted whenever an individual 
borrower defaults, whereas the latter are granted only if a critical mass of borrowers default. Throughout this paper we focus on 
systemic guarantees.   4
The N-to-T output ratio fell about five times as much in Mexico as in the average MEC. Microlevel data reveal that the 
prolonged postcrisis credit crunch mainly affected the N-sector, whereas the T-sector received a large share of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and was insulated from the credit crunch because it could access international financial markets and shift 
away from domestic bank credit. Over the past eight years, tight domestic credit has limited investment and growth in the 
financially constrained N-sector, with the result that it is the T-sector, in large part, that has enjoyed the beneficial effects of 
liberalization and NAFTA.  
Mexico’s persistent credit crunch is puzzling. It cannot be explained by a fall in loanable funds: deposits have 
grown in parallel with GDP, and a large share of the banking system (88 percent by 2001) has been sold to foreigners. What 
accounts, then, for the credit crunch? Evidence suggests that the fall in credit has been associated both with a sharp 
deterioration in contract enforceability and with the policy response to the problem of nonperforming bank loans. 
Since 2001 Mexican exports and GDP have stopped growing. The empirical evidence indicates that the U.S. 
recession can account for part of this slowdown, but not all of it. Our conceptual framework points out some internal factors 
that can help us account for this residual: fire sales and the bottleneck effect. In our model, access to international financial 
markets combined with a real depreciation allows the T-sector to buy inputs at fire-sale prices and thus to grow rapidly in the 
wake of the crisis. However, this rosy scenario cannot go on forever. Lack of credit and of structural reform depresses N-sector 
investment, and the resulting decline in N-sector output generates bottlenecks that eventually block T-sector growth. Does this 
prediction of the model apply to Mexico? Sectoral evidence shows that the subsectors where exports have declined the most are 
those that use N-sector inputs most intensively. Given the lackluster performance of the N-sector, this suggests that bottlenecks 
are contributing to the slowdown. 
Consider next the question of the structure of capital flows. Although several observers have advocated limiting 
bank flows and promoting FDI as a way to reduce financial fragility, our framework makes it clear that limiting bank flows 
may hinder growth. We document that the lion’s share of FDI goes to the T-sector or to financial institutions and, moreover, 
that the small share that goes to the N-sector is allocated to very large firms. Thus most of the inflows that end up in the N-
sector are intermediated by domestic banks. In countries with severe contract enforcement problems, a policy that limits bank 
flows constrains the N-sector at best, and at worst prevents it from growing for years. Thus FDI is not a substitute for risky 
bank flows. 
The findings of this paper do not imply that crises are a good thing. They are the price that must be paid to attain 
rapid growth in the presence of contract enforceability problems. The first-best policy is to improve domestic credit markets by 
implementing judicial reform. If this is not feasible, liberalization will likely lead to financial fragility, as risky bank flows 
become the only source of finance for a large group of firms. Such flows are necessary to avoid bottlenecks and ensure long-run 
growth. 
The Mexican experience shows that long-run growth cannot be based solely on export growth. Because the T-
sector depends on N-sector inputs, the N-sector must also grow in order for the economy to attain a balanced and sustainable 
growth path. This requires adequate financing for domestically oriented firms. In the wake of a crisis, the economy can attain 
spectacular export growth for a few years through a real depreciation and the T-sector’s use of inexpensive N-sector inputs. 
However, low N-sector investment eventually generates bottlenecks, which block further growth. 
The link between liberalization and growth has generated controversy, because some researchers have found no 
significant positive link between the two. This finding might be due either to the country sample being considered or to the use 
of openness indicators. The model we present shows that the asymmetric sectoral responses and the links among liberalization,   5
bumpiness, and growth arise only if contract enforceability problems are severe without being too severe. This underlies the 
importance of the country sample one considers and leads us to focus on the set of countries with functioning financial markets. 
In order to analyze the effects of liberalization, we construct de facto indexes of trade and financial liberalization that 
distinguish the year of liberalization. This allows us to compare the behavior of several macroeconomic variables in both closed 
and open country-years. 
The paper is structured as follows. The next two sections analyze the links among liberalization, bumpiness, and 
growth. The third section analyzes Mexico’s performance. The fourth analyzes the structure of capital flows. The final section 
presents some economic policy lessons and concludes. Appendixes to the paper describe our model and the construction of our 
variables. 
 
2. The Effects of Liberalization 
In this section we analyze empirically the links among liberalization, financial fragility, and growth across the set 
of countries with functioning financial markets. The mechanism described in the introduction operates only in countries with a 
basic level of contract enforcement that permits agents to attain high enough leverage and reap the benefits of liberalization. 
Thus we restrict our data set to countries where the ratio of stock market turnover to GDP was greater than 1 percent in 1998. 
This set consists of sixty-six countries, fifty-two of which have data available for the period 1980-99. Throughout the paper we 
partition this set into seventeen HECs and thirty-five MECs. The former group includes the Group of Seven large industrial 
countries and those countries in which the rule of law index of Kaufman and Aart Kraay is greater than 1.4.
2  
To assess the effects of liberalization we analyze several macroeconomic variables before and after dates of 
liberalization. To do this, we construct two de facto indexes that signal the year during which an MEC switches from closed to 
open. The trade liberalization index signals that a country is open if its ratio of trade (exports plus imports) to GDP exhibits a 
trend break or is greater than 30 percent. The financial liberalization index signals an opening when the series of cumulative 
capital inflows experiences a trend break or if they exceed 10 percent of GDP. The idea is that a large change in a measure of 
openness indicates that a policy reform has taken place and that the reform has had a significant effect on actual flows. 
As explained in more detail in appendix B, we identify the breakpoints using the cumulative sum of residuals 
(CUSUM) method. In most cases the opening dates identified by our indexes are similar to those identified by the stock market 
liberalization index of G. Bekaert, C. Harvey, and R. Lundblad, the financial liberalization index of Graciela Kaminski and 
Sergio Schmukler, and the trade liberalization index of Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner.
3 
                                                 
2 Kaufman and Kraay (1998). The HECs are Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The 
MECs are Argentina, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, 
India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Jordan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, 
South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe. The sample includes forty-one 
of the forty-four countries in the International Finance Corporation’s emerging markets database, the exceptions being Costa 
Rica, Jamaica, and Singapore. Of these, the first two do not satisfy the 1 percent stock market turnover criterion, and for 
Singapore we do not have data. 
3 Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2001); Kaminski and Schmukler (2002); Sachs and Warner (1995). Bekaert, Harvey, and 
Lundblad  focus on stock market liberalization, which, although highly correlated with, is distinct from financial or capital 
account liberalization. Listed firms are a privileged set. Stock market liberalization gives them even more opportunities but 
does not by itself relax the credit constraints on all other firms. Our argument is that financial liberalization promotes growth 
because it eases the borrowing constraints faced by the latter set of firms. Kaminski and Schmukler’s (2002) index of financial 
liberalization covers only a small subset of countries.   6
The country-years identified as liberalized by our indexes do not always coincide with good economic times, 
during which capital is flowing in and the economy is booming. Liberalized country-years include both boom and bust 
episodes.  
All the HECs in our sample have been open since 1980, which is the beginning of our sample period. Figure 1 
exhibits the shares of MECs in our sample that have become open to trade and financial flows. It shows that in 1980 only 25 
percent of these countries were open to trade. Most of these countries started to liberalize in the mid-1980s, and 84 percent had 
liberalized their trade by 1999.  
 






























Trade liberalization Financial liberalization  
Note: The figure shows the share of countries that have liberalized relative to the total number of MECs in our sample. 
Source: own calculations. 
 
Several observers have suggested that, to avoid volatility, countries should liberalize trade but not financial flows. 
Our first stylized fact indicates that this has typically not occurred. 
 
Stylized fact 1.  Over the last two decades trade liberalization has typically been followed by financial liberalization.  
 
Our indexes show that, by 1999, 72 percent of countries that had liberalized trade had also liberalized financial 
flows, bringing the share of MECs that are financially liberalized from 25 percent in 1980 to 69 percent. This close association 
suggests that an open trade regime is usually sustained with an open financial regime, because exporters and importers need 
access to international financial markets. Since capital is fungible, it is difficult to insulate the financial flows associated with 
trade transactions. A few exceptions such as India, Sri Lanka, and Venezuela have liberalized trade but have not liberalized 
their financial markets. 
The hypothesis that trade liberalization leads to financial liberalization can be tested with Granger causality tests. 
The null hypothesis that trade liberalization does not lead to financial liberalization is rejected, with an F statistic of 3.671,   7
which corresponds to a p value of 0.05. By contrast, the null hypothesis that financial liberalization does not lead to trade 
liberalization cannot be rejected, with an F statistic of only 0.018, which corresponds to a p value of 0.98. 
 
Liberalization and GDP Growth 
Here we show that,  across the set of countries with functioning financial markets, both trade and financial 
liberalization have been, on average, good for growth. This result confirms similar links established in the literature. In the next 
two subsections we address the point, made by several observers, that liberalization might not be growth enhancing because it 
leads to crises. We will show that, indeed, financial liberalization has typically been followed by booms and busts, but also that 
financial fragility has been associated with faster GDP growth in spite of the fact that it leads to crises. 
In this section we will not say anything about causality. Appendix A presents a model that shows that, in the 
presence of credit market imperfections, liberalization leads to faster growth because it allows financially constrained firms to 
undertake credit risk, which both eases borrowing constraints and generates financial fragility, leading to occasional crises. The 
model establishes a causal link from liberalization to growth and has testable implications, which we will use to identify the 
mechanism in the next section. 
 

























































































































































Note: The country episodes are constructed using windows of different length for each country. Country episodes that are shorter than 5 years are 
excluded. Averaging over these periods, we estimate a simple growth regression by OLS in which real per capita growth is the dependent variable 
and that only include the respective initial income and population growth. The figure plots the residuals from this regression.   
Source: Population growth for Portugal: IMF, IFS. All other  series: WDI, World Bank.  
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Figure 2 shows that financial liberalization is associated with faster GDP growth. The figure depicts GDP growth 
rates in MECs before and after financial liberalization, after controlling for initial income per capita and population growth.
4 
This simple graphical representation reveals two patterns: first, growth is on average more rapid in open country episodes than 
in closed;
5 second, in almost every country the open episode exhibits more rapid growth than the closed episode.
6 
In order to assess the link between liberalization and growth, we add our liberalization variables to a standard growth 
regression: 
(1)    ?yit = ?yi,ini + ?Xit + ?1TLit + ?2FLit + ?jt         
where ?yit is the average growth rate of GDP per capita; yi,ini is the initial level of GDP per capita; Xit is a vector of control 
variables that includes initial human capital, the average population growth rate, and life expectancy; and TLit and FLit are our 
trade and financial liberalization indicators, respectively. We do not include investment among the control variables, because 
we expect trade and financial liberalization to affect GDP growth through higher investment. 
We estimate the regression in three different ways. First, we estimate a standard cross-sectional regression by 
ordinary least squares. In this case 1980 is the initial year. TLit and FLit take values between 0 and 1, specifying the share of 
years that the country was liberalized during our sample period {0, 0.05, 0.1, …, 1}. Second, we estimate a panel regression 
using two nonoverlapping windows of time: 1980-89 and 1990-99. Here the liberalization variables again take a value between 
0 and 1 during each subperiod. Lastly, we use overlapping time windows as in Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad. For each 
country and each variable, we construct ten-year averages starting with the period 1980-89 and rolling forward to the period 
1990-99. Thus each country has up to ten data points in the time-series dimension. In this case the liberalization variables take 
values in the interval [0,1], depending on the proportion of liberalized years in a given window. We estimate the panel 
regressions using generalized least squares. We deal with the resulting autocorrelation in the residuals by adjusting the standard 
errors according to the method of W. Newey and K. West.
7 
Table 1 reports the estimation results. The financial liberalization variable enters significantly at the 5 percent 
level in all regressions in which it appears. The cross-sectional regression (column 1-1)  shows that, following financial 
liberalization, growth in GDP per capita increases by 2.4 percentage points a year, after controlling for the standard variables. 
The corresponding estimates are 1.7 percentage points in the nonoverlapping panel regression (column 1-2) and 2.5 percentage 
points in the overlapping-windows regression (column 1-3). The last regression is similar to those estimated by Bekaert, 
Harvey, and Lundblad using stock market liberalization dates. They find that GDP growth increases in the range of 0.4 to 1.5 
percentage points. 
                                                 
4 Only one growth rate is shown for countries that were open or closed  throughout the period. Country episodes of less than 
five years are excluded. 
5 Exceptions are China, which performed better than predicted in spite of being closed, and Greece, which is an 
underperforming open economy. 
6 Here an exception is Indonesia, which grew marginally less rapidly during the open period. However, given Indonesia’s major 
crisis in the postliberalization period, the fact that it recorded a growth rate above the predicted value in the second period is 
still remarkable. Note that even in cases (such as Brazil and the Philippines) where the growth rate is less than predicted, the 
gap between the actual and the predicted value is smaller in the open period. 
7 Newey and West (1987). Our panel is unbalanced because not all series are available for all periods. Our source of data is the 
World Development Indicators of the World Bank. See appendix B for the specific sources.   9
Table 1. Regressions Explaining Growth in GDP per Capita with Trade and Financial Liberalization
a  
 







Financial liberalization  2.363**  1.691**  2.502**    2.777**  2.278** 
  (0.533)  (0.603)  (0.101)    (0.115)  (0.172) 
             
Trade liberalization        1.784**  1.606**  0.147** 
        (0.155)  (0.105)  (0.021) 
             
Summary statistics:             
Adjusted R
2 f  0.546  0.633  0.692  0.544  0.747  0.802 
No. of observations  34  59  290  300  280  440 
 
Source: Authors’ regressions. 
a. The estimated equation is equation 1 in the text; the dependent variable is the average annual growth rate of real GDP per capita. Control variables 
include initial per capita income, secondary schooling, population growth, and life expectancy. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity according to Newey and West (1987). ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level. 
b. Standard cross-sectional regression estimated by ordinary least squares for the period 1980-99. 
c. Nonoverlapping panel regression estimated by generalized least squares (GLS) with two periods, 1980-89 and 1990-99. 
d. Overlapping panel regression estimated by GLS with data as ten-year averages starting with 1980-89 and rolling forward to 1990-99. 
e. Same as column 1-5 but with the addition of high-enforceability countries. 
f. The adjusted R
2 is likely to overestimate the share of the variance explained by our right-hand-side variables because of the overlapping nature of 
the regression. No method comparable to that of Newey and West for the standard errors exists for adjusting the R
2, and therefore the values need to 
be interpreted carefully. 
 
Column 1-4 in table 1 shows that, following trade liberalization, GDP growth increases 1.8 percentage points a 
year. This estimate is similar to the 2-percentage-point increase found by Sachs and Warner.
8 Notice that the increase in GDP 
growth is greater following financial liberalization than following trade liberalization. Moreover, column 1-5 shows that when 
we include both variables in the growth regression, the marginal effect of trade liberalization falls to 1.6 percentage points, 
whereas that of financial liberalization increases (to 2.8 percentage points). The larger effect of financial liberalization suggests 
that, in addition to the productivity gains from trade liberalization, the easing of financial constraints has been an important 
source of growth. The effect of financial liberalization will be the focus of the model we present below. Finally, column 1-6 
shows that the positive link between liberalization and growth is also evident in the larger sample that includes HECs as well as 
MECs.  
To deal with the possible endogeneity of the liberalization variables, table B3 in appendix B reports estimation 
results from two-stage least squares regressions using as instruments the legal origin index of Rafael La Porta and others,
9 as 
well as lagged values of all the variables in the regression. The table also reports results of regressions with fixed effects and of 
regressions excluding China and Ireland, which may be driven by other factors. Our benchmark results in the first three 
columns are robust to these different estimation methods. The following stylized fact summarizes our findings. 
 
Stylized fact 2.  Over the period 1980-99 both trade liberalization and financial liberalization are associated with more rapid 
growth in GDP per capita across the set of countries with functioning financial markets. 
 
                                                 
8 Sachs and Warner (1995). 
9 La Porta and others (1999).   10
The existing literature provides mixed evidence on whether openness promotes long-run growth.
10 This can be 
attributed either to the indicators of openness used or to the sample considered.
 We find a statistically significant link for two 
reasons. First, like Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad, we identify liberalization dates that allow us to compare performance 
during liberalized country-years with that during nonliberalized ones. Second, we restrict our analysis to the set of countries 
that have functioning financial markets, because only in these countries do we expect our mechanism to work. 
In contrast, many papers that do not find a significant link use de jure liberalization indexes or de facto indexes 
that do not identify liberalization dates. However, the de jure indexes currently available for a large set of countries do not 
accurately reflect countries’ de facto access to international financial markets. A country that has liberalized de jure may not 
implement the new policy for many years or may simply lack access to international financial markets despite having 
liberalized. For example, some African countries are de jure more financially liberalized than most Latin American countries 
yet have much smaller international financial flows. Several de facto “openness indexes” measure the size of some capital flow 
categories over the sample period. But because these openness indexes do not identify a specific year of liberalization, they are 
not appropriate for comparing the behavior of macroeconomic variables before and after liberalization. 
 
Liberalization and Financial Fragility 
We have shown that both trade and financial liberalization are associated with faster long-run growth across 
countries with functioning financial markets. Financial liberalization has often been criticized on the grounds that it leads to 
crises, which are bad for growth. This argument is neither empirically nor conceptually correct: that financial liberalization 
leads to  infrequent crises does not mean that financial liberalization is bad for growth over the long run. We will show that 
financial liberalization does indeed lead to a greater incidence of crisis. Then we will show that the average positive link 
between liberalization and growth documented above is not driven by those rapid-growth countries that have had no crises. 
Instead, countries that grow faster tend to have crises. That is, there is a strong statistical link between the incidence of crises 
and long-run growth. This finding does not imply that crises are good for (or cause) growth.  
The model we present in the appendix will show that, in the presence of severe credit market imperfections, the 
forces that generate financial deepening and growth also generate—as a by-product—financial fragility. Because financial 
liberalization generates both financial deepening and crises, any analysis of the effects of financial liberalization must weigh its 
benefits against its costs. In short, it would be a mistake to reject financial liberalization by focusing only on its costs and its 
tendency to lead to crises. 
To address systematically the issues discussed above, we need a measure of financial fragility. Unfortunately, no 
existing indexes of financial fragility are comparable across countries. In keeping with the spirit of this paper, we use instead a 
de facto measure of fragility: negative skewness of credit growth. That is, we capture the existence of fragility by one of its 
symptoms: infrequent, sharp, and abrupt falls in credit growth. These abrupt falls occur during the banking crises that are 
characteristic of the boom-bust cycles that typically follow financial liberalization. During the boom, bank credit expands very 
rapidly and excessive credit risk is undertaken. As a result, the economy becomes financially fragile and prone to crisis. 
                                                 
10 See, for instance, Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2001), Chari and Henry (2002), Dollar and Kraay (2002), Edison and 
others (2002), Edwards (1998), Eichengreen (2001), Frankel and Romer (1999), Gourinchas and Jeanne (2003), Prasad and 
others (2003), Quinn (1997), and Rodrik (1998).   11
Although the likelihood that a lending boom will crash in a given year is low, many lending booms do eventually end in a 
crisis.
11 During such a crisis, new credit falls abruptly and recuperates only gradually. 
It follows that a country that experiences a boom-bust cycle exhibits rapid credit growth during the boom, a sharp 
and abrupt fall during the crisis, and slow credit growth during the credit crunch that develops in the wake of the crisis. Since 
credit does not jump during the boom, and crises happen only occasionally, in financially fragile countries the distribution of 
credit growth rates is characterized by negative outliers. In statistical terms, countries that experience boom-bust cycles exhibit 
a negatively skewed distribution of credit growth. In plain language, the path of credit growth is “bumpy.”
12 
If we had infinite data series, the financial liberalization index would be an ideal measure of financial fragility. 
But in a finite sample the index may overlook some cases of fragility that do not— yet—reflect bumpiness. Because most 
MECs that have followed risky credit paths experienced at least one major crisis during our sample period (1980-99), we find 
that negative skewness of credit growth is a good indicator of the riskiness of the credit path followed by a given country. 
 
Figure 3: Credit Growth Distributions 
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b) Descriptive Statistics: 
 
  Thailand  Mexico  India 
Mean  0.143  0.091  0.014 
Std.  0.110  0.303  0.014 
Skewness  -1.945  -0.537  0.157 
 
Note: The sample period is 1988- 1999.  
 
                                                 
11 On the link between lending booms and crises see Gourinchas, Landerretche, and Valdes (2001), Kaminski and Reinhart 
(1999), Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1996a), and Tornell and Westermann (2002). See Bordo and Eichengreen (2002) for a 
historical perspective. 
12 During a lending boom a country experiences positive growth rates that are above normal. However, these are not positive 
outliers because the lending boom takes place for several years, and so most of the distribution is centered around a very high 
mean. Only a positive one-period jump in credit would create a positive outlier in growth rates and generate positive skewness. 
For instance, the increase in capital inflows that takes place when a country liberalizes might generate such positive skewness.   12
Figure 3 depicts the kernel distributions of credit growth rates for India, Mexico, and Thailand.
13 Credit growth in 
India, a typical example of a nonliberalized country, has a low mean, and the data are quite tightly distributed around the mean, 
with skewness close to zero. Meanwhile credit growth in Thailand, a prime example of a liberalized economy, has a very 
asymmetric distribution and is characterized by negative skewness. Mexico, like Thailand, has a very asymmetric distribution, 
and its mean is closer to that of Thailand than to that of India.  
Table 2 shows that the link between financial liberalization and bumpiness holds more generally across MECs. 
The table partitions country-years into two groups: years before financial liberalization and years after. The table shows that 
financial liberalization leads to an increase in the mean of credit growth of 4 percentage points (from 3.8 percent to 7.8 percent) 
and a fall in the skewness of credit growth from near zero to –1.08, and has only a negligible effect on the variance of credit 
growth. This illustrates the following stylized fact. 
 
Stylized fact 3.  Across MECs financial liberalization has been followed by financial deepening. This process, however, has 
not been smooth but is characterized by booms and occasional busts. 
 









MECs     
Mean   0.078   0.038 
Standard deviation   0.151   0.170 
Skewness  -1.086   0.165 
     
HECs     
Mean  0.025  … 
Standard deviation   0.045  … 
Skewness  0.497  … 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
a. The sample is partitioned into two country-year groups: liberalized and nonliberalized. Before the standard deviation and skewness are calculated, 
the means are removed from the series and data errors for Belgium, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom are corrected for. 
 
Notice that, across HECs, credit growth exhibits near-zero skewness, and both the mean and the variance are 
smaller than across MECs. As we will argue below, this difference reflects the absence of severe credit market imperfections in 
HECs. 
The effect of financial liberalization on the mean and the bumpiness of credit growth is represented visually in the 
event study in figure 4. The top panel shows the deviation of the credit-to-GDP ratio, after liberalization, from its mean in 
normal times (that is, the years not covered by the dummy variables in the regression). Over the six years following the 
liberalization date, the credit-to-GDP ratio increases on average by 6 percentage points, and this cumulative increase is 
significant at the 5 percent level. The bottom panel shows the increase in negative skewness, which reflects the increase in 
                                                 
13 The simplest nonparametric density estimate of a distribution of a series is the histogram. A histogram, however, is sensitive 
to the choice of origin and is not continuous. We therefore choose the more illustrative kernel density estimator, which 
smoothes the bumps in the histogram (see Silverman, 1986). Smoothing is done by putting less weight on observations that are 
further from the point being evaluated. The kernel function by Epanechnikov is given by (3/4)[1 - (?B)²]I(|?B| = 1), where ?B 
is the growth rate of real credit and I is an indicator function, which takes the value of 1 if |?B| = 1 and zero otherwise.   13
bumpiness.
14 Here the average negative skewness increases from about zero to -2.5, which is also significant at the 5 percent 
level. 
In the literature, variance is the typical measure of volatility. We choose not to use variance to identify growth-
enhancing credit risk because a high variance of credit growth reflects not only the presence of boom-bust cycles, but also the 
presence of high-frequency shocks. This may lead to false inferences about the links among liberalization, fragility, and growth. 
In the sample we consider, this problem is particularly acute because high-frequency shocks are more abundant than the rare 
crises that punctuate lending booms. 
In short, variance is not a good measure for distinguishing economies that have followed risky, growth-enhancing 
credit paths from those that have experienced high-frequency shocks. By contrast, negative skewness of credit growth is a good 
indicator of the incidence of occasional crises. There might be other, more complex indicators of crises. We have chosen 
skewness because it is a parsimonious way to capture the existence of risky credit paths. Furthermore, it complements the 




Figure 4: Financial Liberalization, Lending Booms and Bumpiness 
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Note:  In panel b) skewness refers to the skewness of real credit growth in the following 10 years. The event windows were constructed from panel 
regressions of the respective variable on dummy variables that take of value of 1 in the period where a country liberalized and zero otherwise. The 
panel regressions are estimated with fixed effects, using a GLS estimator. 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
                                                 
14 Skewness is computed over a ten-year period. Since the event window is based on only ten data points, we consider a shorter 
window. 
15 Skewness is sufficient to identify a risky path. High kurtosis may come on top of it, but it is neither necessary nor sufficient. 
The combination of the two is sufficient but identifies the extreme cases only. For instance, it does not capture many countries 
that have experienced boom-bust cycles (such as Chile, Mexico, and Turkey). Kurtosis could in principle provide further 
information about the distribution. However, in practice it is not useful in identifying the risky and the safe paths. If there is a 
single, short-lived crisis, an outlier in the distribution leads to a long tail on the left and a high kurtosis. However, if there is 
autocorrelation in the growth rates and the crisis is somewhat persistent, or if there is more than one crisis, the distribution 
becomes bimodal, and kurtosis can easily become very low. It is therefore an excessively sensitive measure of bumpiness. 
Depending on the degree of autocorrelation in the shocks, it could be anything from one to infinity (the kurtosis of a normal 
distribution is equal to 3). In principle, one could argue that other low-frequency shocks affect both safe and risky economies. 
Therefore skewness could pick up countries that did not undertake credit risk but had exogenous negative low-frequency shocks 
that led to a negatively skewed distribution. We are not aware that such shocks have hit MECs during the last two decades. 
Veldkamp (2002) has used skewness to analyze asset price crashes.   14
Financial Fragility and Growth 
We have shown that trade liberalization is typically followed by financial liberalization, which in turn leads not 
only to financial deepening but also to booms and busts. On the one hand, in an economy with severe credit market 
imperfections, financial deepening is good for growth because financing constraints are eased. On the other hand, crises are bad 
for growth because they generate systemic insolvencies and fire sales. Ultimately, which of these two effects dominates is an 
empirical question. The following stylized fact summarizes the results that will be discussed below. 
 
Stylized fact 4. Over the last two decades countries with bumpy credit paths have grown faster than those with smooth credit 
paths, when the standard variables are controlled for. 
 
Our results are foreshadowed by figure 5, which shows the link between GDP growth and the moments of credit 
growth across MECs, controlling for initial GDP and population growth. Rapid long-run GDP growth is associated with a 
higher mean growth rate of credit, lower variance, and negative skewness. 
As the figure shows, countries that have followed a risky path, such as Chile, Korea, and Thailand, exhibit 
negatively skewed credit growth and rapid GDP growth. In contrast, countries that have followed a safe path do not exhibit 
negative skewness and have slow growth; examples are Bangladesh, Morocco, and Pakistan. China and Ireland are notable 
exceptions: they have experienced very rapid GDP growth in the last twenty years but have not experienced a major crisis 
despite a high rate of credit growth. 
In order to assess the link between bumpiness and growth, we add the three moments of real credit growth to the 
regression in equation 1: 
(2)  ?yit = ?yi,ini + ?Xit + ß1µ?B,it + ß2s?B,it + ß3S?B,it + ?1TLit + ?2FLit + ?j,t,    
where ?yit , yi,ini, Xit, TLit, and FLit are defined as in equation 1, and µ?B,it, s?B,it, and S?B,it are the mean, standard deviation, and 
skewness of the real credit growth rate, respectively. We do not include investment as a control variable because we expect the 
three moments of credit growth, our variables of interest, to affect GDP growth through higher investment. 
We estimate equation 2 using the same type of overlapping panel data regression as for equation 1. For each 
moment of credit growth and each country, we construct ten-year averages starting with the period 1980-89 and rolling forward 
to the period 1990-99. Similarly, the liberalization variables take values in the interval [0,1], depending on the proportion of 
liberalized years in a given window.
16 Given the dimension of equation 2, the overlapping-windows regression is the most 




                                                 
16Since the higher moments of credit growth cannot be computed in a meaningful way when the observations are few, we 
consider only series for which we have at least ten years of data. 
17 The overlapping-windows regression captures the spirit of the model we present below for the following reason. In the risky 
equilibrium of a liberalized economy there is a probability 1 - u that a crisis will occur at time t + 1, given that a crisis does not 
occur at t. Meanwhile, in a nonliberalized economy, the probability of crisis is always zero. Therefore, according to the model, 
ten-year windows with more liberalized years should exhibit both greater negative skewness and more rapid growth than 
windows with fewer liberalized years.   15
Figure 5: Moments of Credit and GDP Growth  
















































































































































































Note: The graphs plot the moments of real credit growth during the period 1988-1999 against the residuals of a growth regression that controls for 
initial per capita GDP and population growth.   16
Table 3 reports the estimation results. Consistent with the literature, we find that, after controlling for the standard 
variables, the mean growth rate of credit has a positive effect on long-run GDP growth, and the variance of credit growth has a 
negative effect. Both variables enter significantly at the 5 percent level in all regressions.
18 
 
Table 3. Regressions Explaining Growth in GDP per Capita with Moments of Credit Growth
a  
 





Mean of real credit growth rate  0.170**  0.154**  0.093**  0.110** 
  (0.012)  (0.009)  (0.007)  (0.009) 
-0.029**  -0.030**  -0.014**  -0.019**  Standard deviation of real 
credit growth rate  (0.007)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004) 
0.174**  0.266**  -0.095*  0.135**  Negative skewness of real 
credit growth rate  (0.069)  (0.021)  (0.053)  (0.031) 
Financial liberalization      1.894**  1.811** 
      (0.122)  (0.163) 
Trade liberalization      0.838**  0.895** 
      (0.155)  (0.198) 
         
Summary statistics:         
Adjusted R
2 d  0.667  0.629  0.752  0.731 
No. of observations  269  424  253  408 
 
Source: Authors’ regressions. 
a. Equation 2 in the text is estimated using panel data and generalized least squares; the dependent variable is the average annual growth rate of real 
GDP per capita. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are adjusted for heteroskedasticity according to Newey and West (1987). Control 
variables include initial per capita income, secondary schooling, population growth, and life expectancy.  ** indicates significance at the 5 percent 
level. 
b. Sample includes MECs only. 
c. Sample includes HECs and MECs. 
d. The adjusted R
2 is likely to overestimate the share of the variance explained by our right-hand-side variables because of the overlapping nature of 
the regression. No method comparable to that of Newey and West for the standard errors exists for adjusting the R
2, and therefore the values need to 
be interpreted carefully. 
 
The first key point established in table 3 is that the credit that accompanies rapid GDP growth is bumpy. Columns 
3-1 and 3-2 show that bumpy credit markets are associated with higher growth rates across countries with functioning financial 
markets. That is, negative skewness—a bumpier growth path—is on average associated with faster GDP growth. This estimate 
is significant at the 5 percent level.
19  
To interpret the estimate of 0.27 for bumpiness, consider India, which has near-zero skewness, 
and Thailand, which has a skewness of -2. A point estimate of  0.27 implies that an increase in the 
bumpiness index of 2 (from zero to  -2) increases the average long-run GDP growth rate by 0.54 
percentage point a year. Is this estimate economically meaningful? To address this question, note that, 
after controlling for the standard variables, Thailand grows about 2 percentage points faster per year than 
                                                 
18 The link between financial deepening and growth is well established in the literature. See, for instance, Demirguc-Kunt and 
Levine (2001) and Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000). See also the seminal work of McKinnon (1973). 
19 Notice that the estimated coefficient on bumpiness is not capturing country fixed effects. Recall that, for each country, 
skewness varies over time, like all other variables, as we use ten-year rolling averages.   17
India. Thus about a quarter of this growth differential can be attributed to credit risk taking, as measured 
by the skewness of credit growth.
20 
One can interpret the negative coefficient on variance as capturing the effect of “bad” volatility generated by, for 
instance, procyclical fiscal policy.
21 Meanwhile the positive coefficient on bumpiness captures the “good” volatility associated 
with the type of risk taking that eases financial constraints and increases investment. Notice that a country with high variance 
need not have negative skewness.
22  
The second key point is that the association between bumpiness and growth does not imply that crises are 
good for growth. Crises are costly. They are the price that has to be paid in order to attain faster growth in the presence of 
credit market imperfections. To see this, consider column 3-3 in table 3. When the financial liberalization indicator is 
included in the growth regression, bumpiness enters with a negative sign (and is significant at the 10 percent level). In the 
MEC set, given that there is financial liberalization, the lower the incidence of crises, the better. We can see the same 
pattern in the sample that includes HECs as well as MECs: the point estimate of bumpiness in column 3-4 is lower than 
that in column 3-2.
23  
Clearly, liberalization without fragility is best, but the data suggest that this combination is not available to 
MECs. Instead, the existence of contract enforceability problems implies that liberalization leads to higher growth because 
it eases financial constraints but, as a by-product, also induces financial fragility. Despite the rare occurrence of crises, on 
net, financial liberalization has led to more rapid long-run growth, as shown by the estimates in tables 1 and 3. 
 
3.  Identifying the Mechanism: Sectoral Asymmetries and the Boom-Bust Cycle 
We have documented statistically significant correlations between liberalization and growth; among liberalization, 
financial deepening, and bumpiness; and between the latter two and growth. But what mechanism underlies these links? Which 
way does the causation run? 
Appendix A presents a model that establishes a causal link from liberalization to financial deepening and GDP 
growth. Furthermore, the same forces that generate growth also generate financial fragility, which leads to rare crises. The 
theoretical mechanism has unambiguous implications for the behavior of credit and the ratio of N-sector to T-sector output. 
Testing whether these predictions are confirmed by the data will help identify the direction of causation. 
We start by describing the model intuitively. We then explain how the model accounts for the main features of the 
typical boom-bust cycle experienced by MECs, and after that we test the predictions of the model regarding the N-to-T output 
ratio. Finally, we discuss why the evidence strongly supports the view that causation goes from liberalization to growth and not 
the other way around. 
 
                                                 
20 In order to deal with the possible endogeneity of the skewness variable, table B3v in Appendix B reports estimation 
results of two-stage least squares regressions using as instruments the legal origin index of La Porta et. al. (1999), as well 
as lagged values of all variables in the regression. Furthermore, table 16 reports results of regressions with fixed effects and 
of regressions excluding China and Ireland, which may be driven by other factors. Our benchmark results in column 3-2 
are robust to these different estimation methods. 
21 Ramey and Ramey (1995) and Fatas and Mihov (2002) show that fiscal policy-induced volatility is bad for economic growth. 
22 Imbs’s (2002) results are consistent with this view. 
23 The reason why bumpiness enters with a positive sign in the fourth column is that all HECs are liberalized and have near zero 
skewness. Thus, negative skewness acts like a dummy that selects MECs that have liberalized financially.   18
The Mechanism  
We consider a two-sector economy in which there are asymmetries in financing opportunities across sectors. T-
sector firms have perfect access to international capital markets. Meanwhile, N-sector financing is subject to two credit market 
imperfections: contract enforceability problems and systemic bailout guarantees. 
Enforceability problems arise because managers of N-sector firms cannot commit to repaying debt: they are 
able to divert funds to themselves by incurring a cost. As a result, in the model, lenders impose on each N-sector firm a 
borrowing constraint that is proportional to its cash flow. This setup captures the fact that, across MECs, T-sector firms can, in 
general, access international capital markets more easily than most N-sector firms. The latter are financially constrained and 
dependent on domestic bank credit (except for the largest firms, which are in telecommunications, energy and finance).
24 Since 
trade and financial  liberalization have typically not been accompanied by judicial reform, enforceability problems have 
remained. Thus liberalization has exacerbated the asymmetric financing opportunities across sectors. 
The second imperfection found in MECs is that financial liberalization not only lifts restrictions that preclude 
risk taking but also is associated with explicit and implicit bailout guarantees that protect creditors against the effects of 
systemic crises. Because domestic banks have been the prime beneficiaries of these guarantees, this has created incentives for 
investors to use domestic banks to channel resources to firms that cannot pledge international collateral. Thus liberalization has 
resulted in biased capital inflows. T-sector firms and very large N-sector firms are the recipients of FDI and portfolio flows, 
whereas most of the inflows that end up in the N-sector are intermediated through domestic banks, which enjoy systemic 
bailout guarantees.  
A key result of the model is that systemic guarantees may induce banks and their clients to take on credit risk, 
but they do not eliminate borrowing constraints. Why does this happen? Systemic guarantees are promises to step in and repay 
debt obligations only in case of widespread insolvencies. If there is systemic risk in the economy, agents can exploit the subsidy 
implicit in the guarantees by undertaking credit risk. If a borrower defaults in a state of the world where many other borrowers 
are also defaulting, lenders will get repaid in full by the bailout agency. Because the market anticipates this contingent subsidy, 
taking on credit risk reduces the cost of capital. Thus borrowers will find it profitable to take on credit risk if the probability of 
insolvency is small enough. At the same time, guarantees do not neutralize enforceability problems, and thus borrowing 
constraints are not eliminated. This is because a bailout is not granted when only a few borrowers default.
25 
How is this systemic risk generated? Over the past few decades, credit risk has become common in bank and 
corporate balance sheets in MECs in the form of short maturities and currency mismatches. As a result, an important share of 
banks’ liabilities is denominated in foreign currency, whereas their assets are either denominated in domestic currency or are 
loans to the N-sector. If a reversal of capital inflows were to occur, there would be a real depreciation, fire sales, and a 
meltdown of bank balance sheets. It is in these circumstances that bailouts are generally granted. In other words, the interaction 
of contract enforceability problems and systemic bailout guarantees sets in motion a self-reinforcing mechanism. On the one 
hand, the expectation of real exchange rate variability makes it optimal for agents to denominate debt in foreign currency and 
                                                 
24 There are several reasons why T-sector firms can access international financial markets more easily than N-sector firms. For 
instance, since T-sector firms tend to export, they can more easily establish long-term relationships with foreign firms, and they 
can pledge export receivables as collateral. Also, on average, T-sector firms are larger than N-sector firms. 
25 This is why it is important to distinguish systemic from unconditional guarantees, which are granted whenever there is an 
individual default. Notice that if all guarantees were unconditional, enforceability problems would not generate borrowing 
constraints, because a bailout would be granted whenever there is a single default, regardless of the state of the world. The 
results in this paragraph are proved in Schneider and Tornell (forthcoming).   19
run the risk of going bankrupt. On the other hand, the resulting currency mismatch at the aggregate level makes the real 
exchange rate variable, validating agents’ expectations.
26  
We have seen that, in the presence of contract enforceability problems, the credit of most N-sector firms is 
constrained by their cash flow, even though there are bailout guarantees. This happens because guarantees are systemic, so that 
lenders will lend only as much as they are sure that the borrower will be willing to repay. A second key observation is that 
taking on credit risk reduces expected debt repayments because the bailout agency will cover part of the debt obligation in the 
event of a systemic crisis. Thus the bailout guarantee allows financially constrained firms to borrow more than they could 
otherwise. This increase in borrowing and investment is accompanied by an increase in credit risk. When many firms take on 
credit risk, aggregate financial fragility rises, together with N-sector investment and growth. 
Faster N-sector growth helps the T-sector grow faster because N-sector goods are used in T-sector production. 
Therefore the T-sector will enjoy more abundant and cheaper inputs than otherwise. As a result, as long as a crisis does not 
occur, growth in a risky economy is faster than in a safe one. This does not, however, guarantee that, in the long run, average 
growth in a risky economy is also faster than in a safe one, because financial fragility implies that a self-fulfilling crisis may 
occur, in which case GDP growth will fall. 
As we show in appendix A, if crises are rare events, average long-run growth will be faster along a risky path 
than along a safe path unless the costs of a crisis are excessively high. In fact, if crises were not rare, agents would not find it 
profitable to take on credit risk in the first place. This explains why financial fragility leads to faster mean GDP growth. 
The argument has thus established a joint causal link: financial liberalization promotes both long-run growth 
and financial fragility. Since, in any equilibrium, crises both are rare and result in an abrupt and drastic fall in credit, which 
recuperates only gradually, credit growth will be negatively skewed if the time sample is long enough. Thus negative skewness 
of credit growth is a symptom of financial fragility. This explains why skewness of credit growth is a valid right-hand-side 
variable in the regressions we estimate. 
Before moving on to the other predictions of the model, we emphasize that both guarantees and enforceability 
problems are essential to the argument. If there were no guarantees, agents would not be willing to take on credit risk to claim 
the implicit subsidy. Alternatively, if contract enforceability problems were not severe enough, borrowing constraints would not 
arise in equilibrium, and if enforceability problems were too severe, firms could not attain enough leverage, and systemic risk 
would not arise. To link these remarks to the data, we note that explicit and implicit systemic bailout guarantees are present in 
most countries. They capture the “too big to fail” principle: when a systemic meltdown occurs, governments tend to grant 
bailouts.
27 The degree of contract enforceability varies from country to country. We have identified those countries where 
contract enforceability problems are not too severe as those where the stock market turnover-to-GDP ratio was greater than 1 
percent in 1998. We partition this set into countries with either a high or a medium degree of contract enforceability (HECs and 
MECs) as described earlier. The mechanism we have described is operative only in the MEC set.  
                                                 
26 From a theoretical perspective, several other self-reinforcing mechanisms link credit risk with aggregate financial fragility. 
We focus on currency mismatches because they capture the recent experience of MECs. 
27 One might argue that, in the aftermath of crises, guarantees cease to exist temporarily (for instance, because of fiscal 
constraints). However, after a few years they come back. One might also argue that regulations precluding fraud or extreme risk 
taking might be imposed as a result of a crisis. In terms of the model of appendix A, we would say that, in that case, systemic 
guarantees are still in place, but either regulations do not allow agents to exploit them or there is a shift in expectations in the 
wake of the crisis (that is, agents believe that others will not take on credit risk, and so a meltdown and hence a bailout cannot 
take place in the next period).   20
Figure 6: The Boom-Bust Cycle  
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GDP per Capita Growth 





























































 Note:  Event windows were constructed from panel regressions of the respective variable in each graph on dummy variables that take of value of 1 
in the period where a joint banking and currency crisis occurred and zero otherwise. The panel regressions are estimated with fixed effects, using a 
GLS estimator. The N/T and GDP series where computed as mid-year changes. The graphs are the visual representations of the point estimates and 
standard errors from the following pooled regression:  
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where y is the respective variable of interest in the graph, i = 1…35 denotes the country, t = 1980…1999, and j Dummy ? ?  equals 1 at time t+j 
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The Boom-Bust Cycle and the Bottleneck Effect 
In addition to helping us identify the mechanism that links liberalization, fragility, and long-run growth, an 
attractive feature of our approach is that it can account for higher-frequency phenomena, such as the boom-bust cycles typically 
experienced by MECs, and the bottleneck effect. This will allow us, in the next section, to evaluate the Mexican performance. 
We represent the typical boom-bust cycle by means of an event study. Figure 6 shows the average behavior, 
across our set of thirty-five MECs, of several macroeconomic variables around twin currency and banking crises during the 
period 1980-99. Year 0 refers to the year during which twin currency and banking crises take place.
28 In each panel the heavy 
line represents the average deviation relative to tranquil times, the dotted lines represent the 95 percent confidence interval, and 
the thin lines correspond to Mexico.
29  
Typically, before a crisis there is a real appreciation of the currency and a lending boom, during which credit 
grows unusually fast. During the crisis there is a drastic real depreciation, which coincides with a meltdown of the banking 
system, widespread insolvencies, and fire sales. In the aftermath of the crisis there is typically a short-lived recession and a fall 
in credit that is both sharper and longer-lasting than the fall in GDP. Thus the credit-to-GDP ratio declines. The milder fall in 
aggregate GDP than in credit masks the asymmetric sectoral response we emphasize in this paper: N-sector output falls more 
than T-sector output in the wake of a crisis and recuperates more sluggishly thereafter. This asymmetry is also present during 
the boom that precedes the crisis, as the N-sector grows faster than the T-sector and a real appreciation occurs.
30 Finally, the 
figure also shows that investment fluctuations are quite pronounced along the boom-bust cycle, whereas those of consumption 
are not.  
The model can account for these features because financial constraints and credit risk (in the form of currency 
mismatches) coexist in equilibrium, and their interaction generates real exchange rate variability. In a risky equilibrium, 
currency mismatch is optimal and borrowing constraints bind, so that there can be a self-fulfilling, steep real depreciation that 
generates widespread bankruptcies of N-sector firms and the banks that lend to them. Because N-sector net worth falls 
drastically and recuperates only gradually, there is a collapse in credit and N-sector investment, which take a long time to 
recuperate. Since T-sector firms do not face financial constraints, and the real depreciation allows them to buy inputs at fire-sale 
prices, this leads to rapid growth of T-sector output and GDP in the wake of the crisis. As a result, the N-to-T output ratio falls 
drastically and recuperates sluggishly. 
However, rapid GDP growth cannot be sustained over a long period if it is driven only by T-sector growth, because T-sector 
production needs inputs from the N-sector. If the credit crunch continues for a long period, depressed N-sector investment 
eventually leads to bottlenecks: the T-sector no longer enjoys an abundant and cheap supply of N-sector inputs, and its growth 
                                                 
28 We say that there is a twin crisis at year 0 if both a currency and a banking crisis occur during that year, or if one occurs at 
year 0 and the other at year 1. 
29 The graphs are the visual representations of the point estimates and standard errors from regressions in which the variable 
depicted in the graph is the dependent variable, regressed on time dummies preceding and following a crisis. We estimate the 
following pooled regression:  
yit = ai + ??j Dummy?+j + ?it, 
where y is the variable of interest in the graph; i = 1, …, 35 denotes the country; t = 1980, …, 1999; and Dummy?+j equals 1 at 
time t + j and zero otherwise, where t is a crisis year. The panel data estimations account for differences in the mean by 
allowing for fixed effects, as well as for differences in the variance by using a generalized least squares estimator, using the 
estimated cross-sectional residual variances. 
30 This asymmetric sectoral response parallels the  regressions using the N-to-T output ratio in the previous subsection.   23
starts falling. This is the bottleneck effect, which implies that sustainable growth cannot be supported only by export growth. 




We have shown that, in MECs, T-sector firms can in general access international markets and overcome these 
problems more easily than N-sector firms. This asymmetry in financing opportunities imposes restrictions on the behavior of 
credit and the response of the N-to-T output ratio to various shocks. Testing whether these restrictions are present in data from 
MECs will help us identify the mechanism that links liberalization and long-run growth.
  
First, consider the response of the N-to-T output ratio to trade and financial liberalization. Since trade 
liberalization benefits mostly T-sector firms and allows them to establish financing channels in international markets, the N-to-
T output ratio should decrease following trade liberalization. Because financial liberalization is typically followed by a lending 
boom that benefits the financially constrained N-sector relatively more than the T-sector, the N-to-T output ratio should 
increase following financial liberalization. 
Second, consider the response of the N-to-T output ratio to a crisis. The sharp real depreciation that occurs during 
crises worsens the balance sheets of the N-sector firms and leads to fire sales, which benefit the T-sector at the expense of the 
N-sector. Thus, the N-to-T output ratio falls in the wake of crises. Because N-sector credit is constrained by the sector’s net 
worth, and because it takes a long time for that net worth to recover, the N-to-T output ratio might continue to fall for a 
prolonged period. 
Third, because the N-sector is more financially constrained than the T-sector, and banks are highly exposed to the 
N-sector, the N-to-T ratio should move together with credit in normal times and should collapse together with credit during 
crises. 
To test whether these patterns are present in the data, we construct two different indexes of N-sector and T-sector 
production for our set of countries. We then estimate regressions of the following form: 




?jcrisisi,t+j + ?it,   
where N/Tit is the N-to-T output ratio in country i at time t; creditit is real credit growth; TLit and FLit equal 1 if there has been 
trade or financial liberalization, respectively, in country i in or before year t, and zero otherwise; and crisisi,t+j equals 1 in 
country i and year t + j, where t denotes the year when twin banking and currency crises occur in country i, and j denotes the 
number of years after the crisis.
32 
Our first N-to-T output index is used in table 4. This index is constructed by looking at the behavior of the sectoral 
exports-to-GDP ratio. We consider construction, manufacturing, and services, and for each country we classify as the tradable 
sector the one of these three in which this ratio is the highest, and as nontradable the one in which the ratio is lowest. In 
                                                 
31 The fact that T-sector production uses N-sector inputs is key. This is an essential difference between our model and other 
dependent-economy models (see Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996, for an excellent presentation), where the linkage between the N- 
and the T-sectors derives from the fact that both use the same nonreproducible factor. In such a model, rapid N-sector growth 
does not cause rapid T-sector growth, and there is no bottleneck effect. In the short run, a shock that negatively affects the N-
sector’s investment and output generates a real depreciation and benefits the T-sector in both models. In the medium run the 
predictions of the two models differ. In our model the T-sector will suffer a bottleneck as N-sector inputs become scarce. This 
is not the case in the dependent-economy model.   24
appendix B we consider another index based on the variability of the sectoral real exchange rate. The correlation between both 
indexes is 0.74, and the results of regressions using the two indexes are very similar.  
We estimate equation 3 using the MEC sample in a panel data regression that includes fixed effects and uses a 
generalized least squares estimator. The sample covers the period from 1980 to 1999 with annual data. Column 4-1 in table 4 
shows that, across MECs, the N-to-T output ratio responds in the way predicted by the model. The liberalization variables are 
significant at the 5 percent level in all regressions. The estimates show that the N-to-T output index falls following trade 
liberalization, whereas it increases following financial liberalization. The table also shows that the N-to-T output index falls in 
the wake of a crisis. The strongest effect is observed in the first period after the eruption of the crisis. After a small rebound in 
period t + 2, the index continues to fall until t + 4. 
 
Table 4. Regressions Testing for Sectoral Asymmetries 
 
Independent variable  4-1  4-2  4-3 
Financial liberalization  1.147**  0.989**  1.007** 
  (0.140)  (0.148)  (0.141) 
Trade liberalization  -0.780**  -0.581**  -0.782** 
  (0.189)  (0.198)  (0.203) 
Credit    0.481**  0.440** 
    (0.205)  (0.192) 
Rate of real depreciation      2.233** 
      (1.372) 
Crisis year dummy  -0.243*  -0.205*  -0.274** 
  (0.143)  (0.125)  (0.121) 
Crisis year +1  -2.434**  -2.124**  -2.228** 
  (0.143)  (0.184)  (0.177) 
Crisis year +2  0.193*  0.439**  0.370** 
  (0.127)  (0.155)  (0.147) 
Crisis year +3  -0.793**  -0.652**  -0.693** 
  (0.127)  (0.130)  (0.122) 
Crisis year +4  -0.499**  -0.248  -0.348* 
  (0.192)  (0.204)  (0.194) 
Crisis year +5  0.872**  0.837**  0.916** 
  (0.183)  (0.162)  (0.154) 
       
Summary statistics:       
Adjusted R
2  0.655  0.728  0.734 
No. of observations  443  426  360 
Source: Authors’ regressions. 
a. Equation 3 in the text is estimated using panel data and generalized least squares; the dependent variable is the ratio of nontradables sector output 
to tradables sector output. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. * indicates significance at the 10 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level. 
Consider now the link between bank credit and the N-to-T output ratio. As column 4-2 of table 4 shows, credit 
growth enters with a positive sign and is significant at the 5 percent level. This indicates that the co-movement of credit and the 
N-to-T output ratio is not conditional on the occurrence of either a crisis or policy reform. To control for the fact that the ratio 
can move in response to other shocks that generate movements in the real exchange rate, we also estimate equation 3 including 
the rate of real depreciation as an explanatory variable. As column 4-3 shows, both liberalization variables and credit remain 
significant at the 5 percent level when this variable is included. The crisisi,t+j dummies enter significantly at the 5 percent level 
in almost all cases. 
                                                                                                                                                          
32 Rajan and Zingales (1998) examine the sectors in the United States that use external finance more intensively than others. 
They then test whether these same sectors have grown faster in countries that have experienced greater financial deepening.   25
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Response of GDP a shock in credit, USA
 
Note: The heavy lines trace the response of Mexico and the USA to a one-standard deviation shock in credit. Calculations are based on two-
variable VARs, including credit and either GDP or the N-to-T output ratio. Each VAR is estimated from quarterly data in growth rates over 
the sample period from 1980:1 to 1999:4, allowing for 4 lags, a time trend and dummy variables for liberalization and the crisis. Finite sample 
critical values are generated by 1000 Monte Carlo replications. 
 
An alternative way to examine the close link between the N-to-T output ratio and credit growth is through vector 
autoregressions (VARs). If we impose the restriction that output within a quarter is predetermined by past investment, and thus 
does not respond to variations in credit, our model implies that we can run bivariate VARs of credit with the N-to-T output 
ratio, or of credit with GDP. Figure 7 shows the impulse responses of the N-to-T output ratio and GDP to a 1-standard-
deviation shock to real credit growth in Mexico and the United States. The contrast is impressive. In Mexico both GDP and the 
N-to-T output ratio react significantly to a credit shock even when the effects of crisis and liberalization are accounted for.
33 
By contrast, in the United States the effect of credit on GDP is only mildly significant and negligible in 
magnitude. Similarly, the effect on the N-to-T output ratio in the United States is smaller than in Mexico and not statistically 
significant. This difference is consistent with the view that contract enforceability problems are more severe in Mexico than in 
the United States. T-sector firms can overcome these problems, but most N-sector firms cannot, and this asymmetry is reflected 
in a strong response of the N-to-T output ratio. Furthermore, this effect is strong enough to be reflected in aggregate GDP, 
which is the sum of N-sector and T-sector production. 
                                                 
33 The crisis and liberalization dates have been dummied out in the VARs.   26
Are Other Mechanisms Consistent with the Data? 
We have presented a mechanism (based on the model presented in appendix A) in which causation runs from 
liberalization to growth, with financial fragility arising as a by-product: liberalization allows the undertaking of credit risk by 
financially constrained firms, most of which are in the N-sector. This eases borrowing constraints and increases GDP growth, 
but it also generates endogenous financial fragility. Thus a liberalized economy will experience occasional self-fulfilling crises, 
during which a real depreciation coincides with sharp falls in the credit-to-GDP and N-to-T output ratios, as financially 
constrained N-sector firms are hit especially hard. 
This mechanism implies, first, that credit growth and the credit-to-GDP ratio are negatively skewed, experiencing 
sharp falls during the occasional crisis; second, that the N-to-T output ratio collapses during crises and moves in tandem with 
credit in normal times; and third, that the N-to-T output ratio responds positively to financial liberalization and negatively to 
trade liberalization. Our data analysis has shown that MECs have all these predicted characteristics. 
Would we observe this behavior of credit and the N-to-T output ratio if causation went in another direction, or if 
financial constraints did not play a key role? Consider, for instance, an alternative view in which faster GDP growth causes 
liberalization and an increase in capital inflows and in credit growth. In such a framework, faster GDP growth would lead to a 
higher N-to-T output ratio following financial liberalization, to a greater incidence of crises, and to a protracted decline in the 
ratio in the wake of a crisis. We are not aware of any argument in which the causation runs from GDP growth to liberalization 
and financial fragility that is also able to explain these patterns and a negatively skewed credit growth path.
34 
Liberalization may increase long-run growth by improving the quality of institutions, for instance through a 
discipline effect that induces structural reforms that improve property rights and reduce taxation.
35 This channel does not 
generate financial fragility, and it can work side by side with the mechanism we have identified here.
36 
Finally, the asymmetry in financing opportunities between the N- and T-sectors is key to our argument. In the next 




4.  The Effects of Liberalization in Mexico 
Mexico is a prime example of a country that has shifted from a highly interventionist to a liberalized economic 
regime. Given Mexico’s far-reaching reforms, the signing of NAFTA, and the large capital inflows into Mexico, many 
observers expected stellar growth performance. In terms of GDP per capita, Mexico’s performance has in fact been reasonable 
but unremarkable. Even during the 1990s Mexico’s annual growth rate was only about 1 percentage point above the value 
predicted by its initial income and population growth (figure 5), less than in some other countries that have also liberalized. 
Moreover, during the last two years exports and GDP have stopped growing. Why has Mexico’s aggregate growth performance 
failed to meet expectations? Why has there been an export slowdown? Where can we see the effects of liberalization and 
NAFTA? 
                                                 
34 Consider, for instance, the traditional dependent-economy model where the N- and T-sectors use a common, nonreproducible 
factor (such as labor or land) and where there are no credit market imperfections. There is no force in such an economy that 
would lead to a greater incidence of crises following financial liberalization, generate a negatively skewed credit growth 
distribution, or generate a protracted decline in the N-to-T output ratio in the wake of a crisis. 
35 As in Tornell and Velasco (1992). 
36On this point see Kaminski and Schmukler (2002), Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000), and Loayza and Ranciere (2002).   27
Some have argued that countries like Mexico could have grown faster had they not liberalized their financial 
markets so fast, and had they received more FDI and less capital in the form of risky bank flows. In this way Mexico could 
have avoided the lending boom and the tequila crisis.
38 We do not agree. We have seen that, across MECs, liberalization leads 
to faster growth, but also to financial fragility and occasional crises. Mexico is thus no exception in experiencing a boom and a 
bust. Something else must be at work. To find out what that is, we compare Mexico’s experience with the empirical norm 
presented in the previous sections. 
We argue that Mexico’s less-than-stellar growth is not due to liberalization or the lending boom and crisis it 
engendered, and that, in all likelihood, GDP growth would have been slower without liberalization and NAFTA. In fact, in the 
wake of the crisis, exports experienced extraordinary growth and GDP growth recovered quite quickly. Instead we argue that a 
lack of structural reform and Mexico’s credit crunch, which was deeper and more protracted than that of the typical MEC, are 
important factors behind Mexico’s unremarkable growth performance and the recent slowdown in exports.
39 
A distinctive fact about Mexico is that, in the wake of the tequila crisis, the rapid resumption of 
GDP growth was accompanied by a protracted credit crunch. Real credit fell an astounding 58 percent 
between 1994 and 2002 (top panel of figure 8). As a result, the credit-to-GDP ratio, which had increased 
from 13 percent in 1988 to 49 percent in 1994, fell back to 17 percent in 2002. This credit crunch hit the 
N-sector particularly hard and generated bottlenecks that have  blocked T-sector growth. As figure 9 
shows, real credit to the N-sector fell 72 percent between 1994 and 2002. The policy response to the 
banking problem and the sharp deterioration of contract enforceability are key factors contributing to the 
credit crunch. 
We start by summarizing Mexico’s reforms and by comparing several aspects of Mexico’s performance with 
international norms. We then investigate the role of developments in the U.S. economy and of internal factors in explaining the 
differences between Mexico’s economic cycle and that of the typical MEC. Finally, we analyse the credit crunch and provide 
microeconomic evidence on the sectoral asymmetry in financing opportunities that we have emphasized throughout the paper. 
                                                                                                                                                          
37 Tornell and Westermann (2003) also provide evidence for this sectoral asymmetry for a set of MECs by looking at survey 
data from the World Bank. 
38 See, for instance, Stiglitz (1999). 
39 This view is consistent with Bergoening and others (2002), who find that most of the difference in growth between Mexico 
and Chile over the period 1980-2000 is due to differences in total factor productivity (TFP), not differences in capital and labor 
inputs. They conclude that the crucial factor that drives the difference in TFP is differences in banking systems and bankruptcy 
procedures.   28
Figure 8: Credit in Mexico 
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Source: Banco de Mexico. 
 
Figure 9: Credit to the N sector 
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Reforms 
Mexico acceded to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1985, and by 1987 it had eliminated most of its 
trade barriers (except in agriculture). Mexico went from being a very closed economy to one of the most open in the world, and 
it experienced a dramatic increase in exports. Between 1985 and 2000 non-oil exports jumped from $12 billion to $150 billion, 
and the share of trade in GDP rose from 26 percent to 64 percent (figure 10). 
Financial liberalization began in 1989. Although Mexico’s capital account was not totally closed, financial 
markets and capital flows were heavily regulated. The rules that restricted the opening of bank accounts and the purchase of 
stocks by foreigners were relaxed, as were the rules that had strictly restricted FDI.
40 At about the same time, banks were 
privatized, and reserve requirements, interest rate ceilings, and directed lending were eliminated. Finally, the limits on the 
amount of commercial paper and corporate bonds that firms could issue, as well as the prohibition against issuing indexed 
securities, were lifted.
41 
NAFTA was signed in 1993 and went into effect on January 1, 1994. The treaty did not significantly reduce trade 
barriers from their already low levels. Its significance resides in the fact that it codified the new rules of the game and greatly 
reduced the uncertainty faced by investors. On the one hand, it solidified the reforms that had been implemented and reduced 
the likelihood that the Mexican government would violate investors’ property rights as it had in the past. On the other hand, it 
made it very unlikely that the United States or Canada would suddenly impose trade barriers on some products. NAFTA also 
established a supranational body to settle disputes arising under the treaty.
42 
A key shortcoming of the liberalization program is that it was not accompanied by badly needed judicial and 
structural reforms. First, Mexico had and still has severe contract enforceability problems, which make it very difficult for a 
creditor to take over the assets of defaulting debtors. The problems include long delays in the adjudication of commercial 
disputes (with a median time of over thirty months), very low salaries for judges (a median monthly salary of around $1,000), 
biased judgments (lawyers in fourteen out of thirty-two states rate judges as deserving the low score of 1 on an impartiality 
scale), and poor enforcement of judicial decisions. It was not until 2000 that new bankruptcy and guarantee laws were 
introduced.
43 Second, structural reforms in key sectors, such as energy, have not been implemented. This has implied higher 
costs for other sectors in the Mexican economy. 
 
The Mexican Experience in Perspective 
We have seen that risky lending booms and the rare crisis are the norm across fast-growing MECs. Thus it cannot 
be the case that financial liberalization and crisis are the causes of Mexico’s lack of stellar growth. Given the bumpiness it 
experienced, could Mexico have attained faster GDP growth? To address this issue we look again at GDP growth rates (figure 
5). Even during the period of liberalization (1988-99), Mexico’s GDP grew at an annual rate that was less than 1 percentage 
point above the value predicted by its initial income and population growth. This is around 2 percentage points less than 
countries with similar bumpiness, as measured by the skewness of real credit growth. For instance, Chile, Korea, and Thailand 
grew at rates of 2 or 3 percentage points above the predicted values. This indicates that, given its bumpiness, Mexico was an 
                                                 
40 In 1989 a new reglamento to the Ley para Promover la Inversión Mexicana y Regular la Inversión Extranjera (Law for the 
Promotion of Mexican Investment and the Regulation of Foreign Investment) was introduced. Then, in 1993, a new FDI law 
was passed by congress. This law was subsequently revised in 1998. 
41 For a detailed description see Babatz and Conesa (1997) and Martinez and Werner (2002a). 
42 Aspe (1993); Esquivel and Tornell (1998); Lustig (2001); Perry and others (2003). 
43 Calomiris, Fisman, and Love (2000).   30
underperformer during the 1990s. Furthermore, from the first quarter of 2001 through the second quarter of 2003, GDP growth 
has stagnated and nonoil exports have fallen 1 percent a year on average.
44 
 
Figure 10: International Trade 
 



























1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
 
 
                                                 
44 From 1980 to 1989 Mexican GDP grew at an average annual rate of 2 percent a year. Growth then averaged 4 percent a year 
during the five boom years preceding the crisis (1990-94); GDP then fell by 6 percent during the crisis year (1995), and GDP 
growth averaged 5 percent in the following five years (1996-2000). The last two years have witnessed stagnation, with an 
average growth rate of zero. Dornbusch and Werner (1994) analyze Mexico’s performance prior to 1994.   31
To explain the negative growth differential and the recent slowdown in export growth, we compare Mexico’s 
boom-bust cycle with the average cycle across the MEC sample (figure 6). As we explained in the previous section, this figure 
depicts the deviation from the mean in tranquil times of several macroeconomic variables before, during, and after twin 
currency and banking crises. 
As the figure shows, GDP growth in Mexico behaved quite typically both before and during the crisis. Mexico 
experienced a recession that was more severe but also shorter-lived than in the typical MEC during a crisis. The decline in GDP 
of about 8 percent in comparison with the mean during tranquil times lies within the 95 percent confidence interval of the 
average MEC. During the immediate recovery phase, GDP growth in Mexico has been faster than in the typical MEC. In the 
second and third year after the crisis, Mexico grew 3 to 4 percent above its rate of growth in tranquil times, which is outside the 
95 percent confidence bands. 
The behavior of GDP growth masks the sharp sectoral asymmetry that we emphasize throughout this paper. As 
figure 6 also shows, in the three years preceding the crisis, the N-to-T output ratio increased by a cumulative 3 percent, despite 
a negative long-term trend toward T-sector production. This change lies within the 95 percent confidence interval of the 
average MEC. In contrast, in the three years after the crisis, the N-to-T output ratio declined cumulatively by about seven times 
as much as in the average MEC–a significantly larger drop than is typical. Furthermore, even by the third year after the crisis, 
this ratio showed no signs of reversion toward its mean in tranquil times. This persistent decline of the N-to-T output ratio can 
also be seen in figure 10, which depicts N-sector and T-sector production in Mexico from 1988 to 2001. 
The abnormal behavior of the N-to-T output ratio in Mexico is closely linked to that of bank credit. Although the 
level of credit to GDP, relative to tranquil times, was already higher, three years before the crisis, than the international norm, 
the change in the credit-to-GDP ratio in Mexico was typical during the boom but was an outlier in the postcrisis period. As 
figure 6 reveals, Mexico experienced a change in the credit-to-GDP ratio of about 23 percentage points in the three years 
preceding the crisis. This change is above the MEC average, although it lies within the 95 percent confidence interval for the 
typical MEC. However, in the wake of the tequila crisis, Mexico’s credit crunch was both more severe and more protracted than 
in the typical MEC. In the three years after the crisis, the credit-to-GDP ratio in Mexico fell by 30 percent, significantly more 
than in the average MEC. 
The credit crunch affected mainly the N-sector. As figure 9 shows, bank credit to the N-sector fell in each year 
from 1995 to 2002. In contrast, the T-sector was not hard hit by the credit crunch. As we will show below using microlevel data 
from the economic census and from the set of firms listed on the stock market, in the wake of the crisis, T-sector firms in 
Mexico had significantly greater access to international financial markets than did N-sector firms. 
Rapid T-sector growth thus explains why GDP, which is the sum of N-sector and T-sector output, did not fall as 
much as either N-sector output or credit, and why robust GDP growth resumed one year after the crisis. This remarkably fast T-
sector growth is associated with the extraordinary export growth that can be observed in figure 6. Whereas, remarkably, export 
growth in the typical MEC does not display any significant deviation from tranquil times in the wake of crisis, Mexico’s 
exports increased more than 20 percent above its mean in tranquil times in 1995. This increase is certainly an outlier. 
The investment-to-GDP ratio behaved typically during the boom phase. During the crisis, however, it fell 
significantly more than in the typical MEC, with a -15 percent deviation from tranquil times recorded in the year after the crisis. 
Its recovery was also more pronounced, as the ratio climbed to 8 percent above its level in tranquil times in the third year after 
the crisis. Finally, consumption displays a similar cyclical pattern, although with a much smaller amplitude than that of 
investment.   32
In sum, our findings indicate that the lack of spectacular growth in Mexico during the 1990s cannot be blamed on 
liberalization, the boom, or the crisis. In fact, the effects of liberalization and of NAFTA can be observed in the extraordinary 
growth of exports, which drove the fast and robust recovery of GDP growth in the years following the crisis. However, the 
dynamism of exports has faded: since the first quarter of 2001, exports have fallen in absolute terms and GDP has stagnated. 
What role have developments in the U.S. economy played in Mexico’s export performance? And what role have internal factors 
played? 
 
Figure 11: Non-tradables and Tradables Production    
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Export Growth 
Because a large share of Mexican exports goes to the United States, a natural question is to what extent 
developments in the U.S. economy explain the behavior of exports. In particular, we investigate to what extent developments in 
U.S. imports or U.S. manufacturing can account for the extraordinary growth in Mexico’s exports in 1995-2000 and the 
stagnation in 2001-03.
45 We will show that developments in the United States can explain part but not all of the fluctuations in 
export growth. We then discuss how the predictions of the model can help explain the residual export growth. We explain the 
boom in exports with reference to the fire sales that occurred during the crisis, and the recent stagnation with reference to the 
lack of structural reform, the protracted credit crunch and the N-sector bottlenecks they generated.  
Before presenting the results, we wish to emphasize that the strict macroeconomic policies that Mexico put in 
place in the wake of the crisis were necessary for the extraordinary growth in exports. These policies kept the fiscal balance 
under control and ensured that the peso did not become overvalued in real terms. 
First, we investigate the link between U.S. imports and Mexican exports at a quarterly frequency over the period 
1988:1-2003:2.
46 We estimate a bivariate VAR that allows for two lags. Since both series have a unit root and their growth rates 
are stationary, we perform our analysis using growth rates.
47 The top left panel of figure 11, which traces the response of 
Mexican exports to a 1-standard-deviation shock to U.S. imports, shows that the response is equivalent to 3.5 percent of a 
standard deviation in the first quarter, and to 3, 2.6, and 2.2 percent in the following quarters. All of these responses are 
significant at the 5 percent level.  
Although these impulse responses provide information on the effect of a standardized shock, they do not indicate 
the extent to which a given shock contributes to the total forecast error variance of Mexico’s exports. To assess the relative 
importance of shocks to U.S. imports, we decompose the forecast error variance of Mexican exports into the part that is 
attributable to shocks emanating from the United States and the part attributable to shocks emanating from Mexico. The top 
right panel of figure 11 shows that U.S. shocks account for approximately 40 percent of the forecast error variance, and shocks 
from Mexico the remaining 60 percent. In other words, unexpected changes in Mexico’s export growth are mainly generated by 
shocks to its own economy. Although statistically significant, U.S. shocks play only a secondary role. 
A similar pattern emerges when we estimate the VAR using U.S. manufacturing instead of imports. The long-run 
effects are of similar magnitude, with shocks to U.S. manufacturing accounting for around 40 percent of the unexpected 
forecast error variance. However, compared with a shock to U.S. imports, it takes longer for a shock to U.S. manufacturing to 
fully translate into a reaction by Mexican exports.  
To illustrate what periods account for the low relative importance of U.S. shocks, we plot in figure 12 the average 
residuals from the VARs. The unusually high residual growth of exports in the crisis episode and the negative outliers of recent 
years indicate that the performance of the U.S. economy does not fully account for the skyrocketing 32 percent increase in 
Mexican exports during 1995, or for the 1 percent fall in exports in the last two years. 
 
                                                 
45 We choose U.S. imports and manufacturing instead of a broader aggregate, such as U.S. GDP, because our objective is to 
determine an upper bound on the effect of trends in the U.S. economy on Mexican exports. 
46 An earlier starting date is not appropriate, because the two countries did not trade much before 1987. 
47 We cannot reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration according to finite-sample critical values of Cheung and Lai (1993).   34
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Note: In the two figures on the left, the heavy lines trace the response of Mexican exports to a one-standard deviation shock in US imports and US 
manufacturing, respectively. Calculations are based on two-variable VARs, including Mexican exports and either US imports or US manufacturing. 
Each VAR is estimated from quarterly data in growth rates over the sample period from 1987:1 to 1999:4, allowing for 2 lags in the estimation. The 
two figures on the left, trace the share of the forecast error variance that is attributable to the respective variables. 
  
A simpler way to make the same point is to compare the growth rate of Mexican exports with those of U.S. 
imports and U.S. manufacturing.  Table 5 shows the average annual growth rates and  figure  13 the de-meaned growth 
differentials. For the comparison with U.S. imports, the largest deviations occurred during the crisis (1995), with an abnormally 
large growth residual of 14 percent (bottom panel), and from 2001:1 to 2003:2, with a residual of -11 percent. In fact, during 
some quarters the residuals are more than 2 standard deviations away from the expected value of zero. In contrast, the average 
residuals were relatively small in 1990-94 and 1996-2000 (1 percent and zero, respectively). A similar pattern is observed in the 
export growth residuals obtained in the comparison with U.S. manufacturing.
48  
                                                 
48 These de-meaned growth differentials have the same interpretation as the residuals of an ordinary least squares regression of 
Mexican export growth on U.S. import growth. The slope coefficient in that regression is 0.83 and is significant at the 5 percent 
level, and the R
2 is 0.3. This shows that 30 percent of the total variance in Mexican exports is explained by U.S. imports. Recall 
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Next we explain how the fire sales and bottlenecks generated by the credit crunch and lack of structural reform 
help account for these large deviations. We then provide empirical evidence in support of these effects. 
 
Table 5. Growth in Mexican Exports and in U.S. Manufacturing and Imports, 1990-2003
a 
 
Percent a year 
 
Indicator  1990-94  1995  1996-2000  2001-03
b 
Export growth in Mexico  15  32  17  -1 
Manufacturing growth in the United States  2  5  5  -2 
Import growth in the United States  7  11  10  2 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from INEGI and International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics. 
a. Averages of quarter-to-quarter growth rates. 
b. Through 2003:2. 
 
Figure 13: Unexplained Export Growth (I) 
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Figure 14: Unexplained Export Growth (II) 
(Demeaned Growth Differentials) 
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(c) Average Demeaned Differences  
 
Fire Sales and the Bottleneck Effect 
In our model economy the real depreciation that accompanies a crisis severely affects the cash flow of N-sector 
firms with currency mismatches in their borrowing and lending. As a result, N-sector credit and investment fall. In contrast, 
access to international financial markets combined with the real depreciation allows T-sector firms to buy inputs at fire-sale 
prices. This leads to rapid growth of exports, T-sector output, and GDP in the wake of the crisis.  
However, as we discuss in the section on the model, rapid GDP growth cannot be sustained over a long period if it 
is driven only by T-sector growth, because T-sector production needs inputs from the N-sector. The real depreciation and the 
credit crunch depress N-sector investment, which eventually leads to bottlenecks: exporters then no longer have an abundant 
and cheap supply of N-sector inputs. Thus, ceteris paribus, at some point export growth starts falling as competitiveness erodes. 
To test whether these predictions of the model apply to Mexico, we look at the annual manufacturing survey of 
Mexico’s National Institute of Statistics, Geography, and Informatics (INEGI), which includes medium-size and large firms in 
the manufacturing sector, covers more than 80 percent of manufacturing value added, and includes 206 five-digit subsectors. 
First we assess the importance of N-sector inputs in T-sector production, and then we contrast the behavior over time of exports 
that are highly dependent on N-sector inputs and of exports that are less dependent on the N-sector. 
According to this survey, N-sector inputs represented on average 12.4 percent of total variable costs in the 
manufacturing sector over the period 1994-99. This share ranges from 5 percent in some food manufacturing subsectors to 28 
percent in some chemical subsectors. Table 6 shows the shares of the main N-sector inputs used in several manufacturing 
subsectors that use N-sector inputs intensively. For example, the nonmetallic minerals products subsector devotes 9.5 percent of 
its expenditure to repairs and maintenance, 4.9 percent to rents and leases, 2 percent to freight and transport, 5.6 percent to 
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Table 6. Use of Nontradable Inputs in Selected Mexican Tradable Goods Industries, 1994-99
a 
 
Percent of total expenses 
  Input industry 





Electricity  Rentals 
and leases  Other 
Textiles and apparel   23.0  16.5  2.4  1.7  0.8  1.2  0.5 
Paper and printing  
24.8  11.5  3.5  1.1  3.1  3.3  2.3 
Basic inorganic chemical 
products, perfumes and 
cosmetics, and plastic and rubber   27.7  1.1  6.8  1.0  8.2  8.2  2.4 
Nonmetallic mineral products   23.4  0.3  9.5  2.0  5.6  4.9  1.0 
Discs and magnetophonic tapes  
22.6  4.8  8.8  1.0  1.2  4.0  2.7 
Total manufacturing   12.4  2.1  3.4  2.2  1.7  1.3  1.7 
 
Source: Annual Industrial Survey, National Institute of Statistics, Geography, and Informatics. 
a. Data are for expenditures on those N-sector inputs that are part of total variable cost; they are averages over the period; investment and expenditure on 
fixed assets are excluded. 
 
Figure 15: The Bottleneck effect 
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Note: The figure plots the ratio of exports of subsectors with the highest 20% and the lowest 20% of N-costs 
in total costs. 
Source: INEGI 
 
Not only are N-sector inputs a significant fraction of T-sector production, but those subsectors that are intensive in 
N-sector inputs display precisely the pattern that the model predicts. Figure 14 shows the ratio of manufacturing exports of the 
subsectors that use N-sector inputs most intensively to those that use these inputs least intensively (we call this the X-ratio). The 
figure shows three things. First, during the lending boom period, when the N-sector was booming and investing heavily, N-
sector goods were expensive and the X-ratio fell. Second, after the crisis the situation reversed: in 1996-98 N-sector inputs   39
could be bought at fire-sale prices, and the X-ratio increased. Third, the recent lack of N-sector investment has generated a 
dramatic fall in the X-ratio. 
In sum, the asymmetric behavior of different export subsectors supports the view that fire sales contributed to the 
extraordinary export growth in the wake of the crisis, and that the bottleneck effect has contributed to the export slowdown over 
the last two years. We do not rule out the possibility that other external factors, such as competing exports from China, have 
also contributed to the export slowdown. However, it is unlikely that such external factors could generate the asymmetric 
export response we have documented.  
 
How Did Financial Fragility Emerge? 
The early 1990s saw a dramatic increase in the resources available to domestic banks. In addition to the increase 
in capital inflows, the consolidated public sector balance swung from a deficit of 8 percent of GDP in 1987 to a surplus of 1 
percent in 1993. Thus credit from the banking system to the public sector fell from 14 percent of GDP to 2 percent. 
Although bank liabilities were often denominated in foreign currency, the income streams that serviced those 
liabilities were ultimately denominated in domestic currency. Sometimes the banks lent in pesos, and when they lent in dollars, 
a large share of bank credit went to households and N-sector firms, whose products were valued in pesos. In both cases the 
banks were incurring the risk of insolvency through currency mismatch.
49 As is well known, currency mismatch was also 
present on the government’s books through the famous dollar-denominated tesobonos.  
Agents both in the government and in the private sector understood that they were taking on credit risk. However, 
as the model explains, taking on such risk was individually optimal because of the presence of systemic bailout guarantees and 
the rosy expectations generated by the prospect of NAFTA. These expectations may have been well founded, but unfortunately 
in 1994 several negative shocks to expectations befell the country. The first day of the year brought the news of the revolt in the 
southern state of Chiapas. Then March witnessed the assassination of the leading presidential candidate, Luis Donaldo Colosio. 
Although presidential elections took place in July without civil unrest, and Ernesto Zedillo won with an ample majority, a full-
blown crisis erupted at the end of 1994, a few weeks after he took office. 
In terms of the model, March 1994 marks the date of the crisis, because it is the “tipping point” that marks a 
reversal of capital inflows. Instead of letting the peso depreciate, the monetary authorities responded by letting reserves fall.
50 
Central bank reserves net of tesobonos fell from $27 billion in February to $8 billion in April. They stood at negative $14 
billion at the end of 1994.  
 
What Accounts for Mexico’s Credit Crunch? 
As mentioned earlier, Mexico’s credit crunch is an outlier relative to that experienced by the typical postcrisis MEC. Not 
only did credit suffer a sharp fall during the crisis, but after a small rebound it continued falling until 2001. Credit growth 
resumed in 2002, but it again turned negative in the first quarter of 2003. This path of credit is all the more puzzling when one 
considers that the share of bank assets owned by foreigners increased from 6.4 percent in 1994 to 88 percent in 2001 (figure 
16), and the foreign banks are arguably well capitalized. 
 
                                                 
49 The share of bank credit allocated to the N-sector reached 63 percent in 1994. Martínez and Werner (2002b) and Tornell and 
Westermann (2003) document the existence of currency mismatch. 
50 See, for instance, Lustig (2001) and Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1996b).   40
Figure 16: Foreign Participation in the Mexican Banking System 
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Source: Bank Failure Management, prepared by SHCP for the APEC, 2001. 
 
Two important factors have contributed to the deepening credit crunch: the deterioration in contract enforceability and the 
policy response to the nonperforming loans (NPLs) problem. We consider each in turn.  
In the wake of the crisis, many borrowers stopped servicing their debts, and this noncompliance went unpunished by the 
authorities. As a result, a cultura de no pago (culture of nonpayment) developed: borrowers that could have paid chose not to 
pay. This deterioration in law enforcement has manifested itself in other ways, such as an increase in tax evasion and in crime 
generally. Figure 17 shows that whereas tax collection improved and crime fell up to 1994, both have deteriorated since 1995. 
In terms of our model, this pattern implies a decline in the coefficient of enforceability, which induces a fall in the credit 
multiplier and in the investment of credit-constrained firms. 
Because of the currency mismatch, all banks were de facto bankrupt in the wake of the crisis. However, regulatory 
discipline was not immediately established: only a small share of NPLs were officially recognized. The banks’ bailout took the 
form of exchanging the officially recognized NPLs for ten-year government bonds that paid interest but could not be traded.
51 
This piecemeal rescue program, which was meant to be temporary, soon became an open-ended bailout mechanism.
52 Despite 
rapid GDP growth, the share of NPLs in total loans kept rising, from 15 percent in 1995 to 21 percent in 1998, before gradually 
declining. During this period banks were not making new loans but were making profits because they were receiving interest 
income on the government bonds they had received in exchange for their NPLs. 
                                                 
51  For an analysis of the banking problem see Krueger and Tornell (1999). 
52 Notice that this program is different from the systemic guarantees we consider in the model below. Under the latter, bailouts 
are not granted on an idiosyncratic basis, but only if a systemic meltdown takes place.    41
Figure 17: Law Enforcement 






























































































































0.65  Tax Evasion (% of Potential Revenues) 
Number of Criminal Suspects by Theft 
 
Notes: Number of criminal suspects by theft comes from SIMBAD, INEGI.       
Tax evasion is constructed using value added revenues. Potential revenue is equal to the sectoral GDP times the share 





The increased cost of the rescue package is associated with the fact that banks were saddled with nonrecognized 
de facto NPLs (that is, evergreen accounts) and failed to increase their capital in order to make new loans (figure 18).
53 The 
quality of the portfolio deteriorated over time as moral hazard problems developed and the accrued interest of the evergreen 
accounts had to be capitalized. 
Over time several measures have been taken to solve the banking problem. First, in 2000 the bankruptcy and 
guarantee laws were reformed so as to limit ex post judicial discretion in the disposition of loan collateral and in the resolution 
of insolvent firms. However, given certain implementation problems and the limited power under the Mexican constitution of 
creditors to exercise their collateral rights, it is not yet clear whether the reforms will lead in practice to better contract 
enforceability. Second, key loopholes in bank accounting have been eliminated. Third, part of the debt overhang problem has 
been resolved (mainly the smaller debts) through the Punto Final program. However, unresolved problems remain in the areas 
of judicial reform and the resolution of large debts. 
 
                                                 
53 Evergreen accounts are those in which the bank lends the debtor the principal plus interest that the debtor was supposed to 
have repaid, and these transfers are counted as “loans.”   42





Sectoral Asymmetries: What Do Micro-Level Data Say? 
The existence of sectoral asymmetries in financing opportunities is a key element in our theoretical argument, as 
well as in our account of the Mexican experience. Here we will show that, in Mexico, T-sector firms are on average larger than 
N-sector firms and have better access to international financial markets. We will also show that T-sector firms were not as hard 
hit by the credit crunch as N-sector firms. 
To establish these facts we analyze two Mexican microeconomic data sets: the first consists of data on firms listed 
on the Mexican stock market (the Bolsa Mexicana de Valores, or BMV), and the second is the economic census. The BMV set 
contains only those firms that issue either bonds or equity (310 firms), whereas the census includes all firms in the economy 
(2,788,222 firms). 
As table 7 shows, the BMV set contains only large firms, whereas the vast majority of firms in the economy are 
small and medium-size. Moreover, although the BMV set contains both N- and T-sector firms, it is more representative of the 
T-sector than of the N-sector. The bias is greater for the N-sector than for the T-sector both in terms of the distribution of fixed 
assets and in terms of sales. For instance, as table 7 also shows, the sales of large N-sector firms constitute only 12 percent of 
economy-wide N-sector sales, according to the census of 1999, whereas the corresponding share for large T-sector firms is 64 










1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
NPL / Total Loans (Corporate) 
NPL / Total Loans (Corporate, including restructured loans*) 
* Restructured loans include the programs of UDIS, IPAB-FOBAPROA, restructured portfolio affecting the flow 
participation scheme and Special CETES 
*The IPAB-FOBAPROA non-performing loans were obtained by applying the ratio of non-performing loans to total  IPAB-
FOBAPROA portfolio to IPAB-FOBAPROA's Titles.   43
Table 7. Mexican Firms in Tradable and Nontradable Sectors by Firm Size, 1999
a 
 
  Economic Census       
  Number of firms  Share of sector sales (percent)    BMV-listed firms (number) 
Firm size  Nontradable  Tradable  Nontradable  Tradable    Nontradable  Tradable 
Small
b  2,371,468  329,242  56  10    0  0 
Medium
c  65,630  12,054  32  26    0  0 
Large
d   4,239  5,589  12  64    110  200 
 
Sources: Economic Census of Mexico and Bolsa Mexicana de Valores.  
a. Tradable sectors include primary goods and manufacturing. Nontradable sectors include construction, trade, telecommunications, transportation, 
hotels and restaurants, real estate, and other services. Financial services, electricity, gas, and water and not included in nontradables. For those firms 
entering between 2000 and 2002 or exiting between 1991 and 1999, data are for the year closest to 1999 for which data on total assets were 
available. The Bolsa Mexicana de Valores is the principal Mexican stock exchange. 
b. Fixed assets less than $148,000 in 1994 dollars. 
c. Fixed assets less than $2,370,000 in 1994 dollars. 
d. Fixed assets greater than $2,370,000 in 1994 dollars. 
 
Figure 19: The stock market is not representative of the economy  
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Because the BMV set is biased toward the T-sector, and firms in this set are the only ones that issue bonds and 
equity internationally, it follows that the T-sector has better access to international financial markets than the N-sector. To the 
extent that Mexico is typical of other MECs, this fact provides an important warning. In contrast to HECs, in MECs stock 
market-based data sets (such as Datastream or Worldscope) do not reflect economy-wide behavior but rather are biased toward 
the T-sector.
54 
To get an idea of the extent to which the crisis affected the access of BMV firms to external financing, consider 
the ratio of issuance of long-term bonds and equity to the stock of bonds and equity. Table 8 shows that this ratio jumped from 
an average of 1.6 percent in 1991-94 to 4.7 percent in 1996-97.
55 This jump indicates that BMV firms were not hard hit by the 
credit crunch.  
Another fact that points in the same direction is that there was no significant increase in bankruptcies among 
BMV firms. As table 9 shows, 6 percent of firms exited the BMV in 1995, and 3 percent in 1996. The average rate of exit over 
                                                 
54 Tornell and Westermann (2003), using survey data from the World Bank, find a similar sectoral asymmetry across MECs.   44
the entire sample period was 3.6 percent, with a standard deviation of 3.5 percent. The increase in bankruptcies in 1995 was 
therefore not statistically significant. 
 
Table 8. Issuance of Long-Term Bonds and Equity by Firms Listed on the Mexican Stock Market, 1991-2001
a 
 











1991  0.5  0.4  0.9 
1992  1.7  0.2  2.0 
1993  2.0  0.2  2.2 
1994  1.1  0.1  1.3 
1995  0.5  0.0  0.5 
1996  3.8  0.0  3.8 
1997  5.0  0.7  5.8 
1998  3.0  0.0  3.0 
1999  1.1  0.3  1.4 
2000  3.1  0.0  3.2 
2001  2.0  0.0  2.0 
Source: Bolsa Mexicana de Valores.  
a. Data are averages for all nonfinancial firms listed on the Bolsa Mexicana de Valores for which balance sheet data were available. Numbers may 
not sum to totals because of rounding. 
b. Bonds with maturity of one year or longer. 
 
Table 9. Entry and Exit from the Mexican Stock Market, 1990-2002 
 
Percent of listed firms
a 
 
 Year  Firms entering  Firms exiting
b 
1990  3.6  0.0 
1991  16.4  1.7 
1992  7.5  12.0 
1993  10.2  3.9 
1994  11.1  6.7 
1995  2.1  6.4 
1996  8.1  3.0 
1997  11.2  3.5 
1998  1.9  5.8 
1999  0.7  1.4 
2000  2.7  2.1 
2001  0.7  3.4 
2002  2.2  0.0 
 
Source: Bolsa Mexicana de Valores.  
a. Listed firms include some privately held firms that have issued corporate bonds. 
b. Firms that left the stock market or that were suspended and remained suspended as of 2003. 
 
                                                                                                                                                          
55 New equity issues are typically placed in New York through American depository rights (ADRs).    45
The availability of external finance for the BMV firms contrasts with the protracted fall in the nationwide 
credit-to-GDP ratio over 1995-2001. The reason is that the BMV firms shifted away from domestic bank credit in the wake 
of the crisis. This shift is reflected in the increase in the share of foreign-denominated debt from an average of 35 percent 
of the total in 1990-94 to 45 percent during the credit crunch period (1996-2000; table 10). Since the BMV set is biased 
toward the T-sector, this contrast in financing opportunities explains why T-sector production did not fall so sharply in the 
wake of the crisis, and why GDP recovered so fast. 
Because the economic census does not provide data on the financing of firms, we look instead at the behavior 
of investment. We group the observations into quintiles and compute the change in the investment rate between 1994 and 
1999.
56 Figure 20 shows that, within each size class, the investment rate fell more in the N-sector than in the T-sector firms. 
Furthermore, the quintile that contains the largest T-sector firms is the only group that experienced an increase in the 
investment rate. Table 11, which reports the average investment rate across all size classes, shows that in 1994, before the 
crisis, both sectors had essentially the same investment rate (about 7 percent). In contrast, in 1999 the investment rate of 
the N-sector was almost 1 percentage point lower than that in the T-sector (3.7 percent versus 4.6 percent). 
 
Table 10. Foreign Liabilities of Firms Listed on the Mexican Stock Market, 1990-2002 
 














1990  31.6  34.0  23.8 
1991  32.9  36.5  23.7 
1992  32.7  36.0  25.0 
1993  36.0  39.3  29.3 
1994  43.9  50.5  30.6 
1995  46.4  53.5  34.2 
1996  44.8  52.7  32.6 
1997  47.4  54.8  37.2 
1998  48.4  56.6  37.8 
1999  44.9  52.1  36.4 
2000  45.4  51.8  37.0 
2001  44.4  52.1  35.6 
2002  40.6  46.7  33.1 
 Source: Bolsa Mexicana de Valores.  
 
To see whether the sectoral asymmetry we observe across the quintile of largest firms in  figure 18 is 
associated with an asymmetry in financing opportunities, we run a standard cash-flow regression similar to that by S. 
Fazzari, R. Hubbard, and B. Petersen.
57 We regress the investment rate on the change in sales, on cash flow, and on cash 
flow interacted with a dummy that equals 1 for nonexporting firms during the years 1995-97 or 1995-98. Following 
Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen, we interpret a positive effect of cash flow on investment as an indication of financing 
                                                 
56 Because of confidentiality requirements, each observation represents not a single firm but a group of firms. Each group 
contains firms that are similar in size, are in the same subsector, and are located in the same geographical area. See the 
appendix for details. 
57 Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988).   46
constraints (the change in sales controls for investment opportunities). We estimate the regression including fixed effects 
and using a generalized least squares estimator. The positive coefficient on the interaction dummy in table 12 implies that, 
in the wake of the crisis, cash flow was a more important determinant of investment for nonexporters than for exporters. 
This means that nonexporters were more credit constrained in the wake of the crisis. This effect is significant at the 5 level 
in the period 1995-97 and at the 10 percent level in 1995-98. 
 
Table 11. Investment Rates of Firms in Tradables and Nontradables Sectors, 1994 and 1999 
 
Percent of capital stock in preceding year, and ratio 
 
Sector  1994    1999 
Nontradables  7.1    3.7 
Tradables   6.9    4.6 
  Ratio of nontradables to 
  tradables investment rate  1.03    0.81 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from the Mexican Economic Census. 
 
















es: The investment rate is measured as net investment in fixed asset over the total level of fixed assets. Sales are the total revenues derived from own 
activity. The value displayed is the average investment rate in 1999 minus its value in 1994.  
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b  12-1  12-2 
Cash flow   0.04***  0.02** 
  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Change in sales   0.05***  0.05*** 
  (0.00)  (0.00) 
0.15***  0.05*  Cash flow interacted with crisis 
and nonexporter dummies
c   (0.05)  (0.03) 
     
Summary statistics:     
No. of observations  1,430  1,592 
No. of firms  328  338 
Adjusted R
2  0.195  0.194 
 
Source: Authors’ regressions. 
a. The regressions are estimated with fixed effects by generalized least squares and include year dummies (not reported). Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. * denotes significance at the 10 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, *** at the 1 percent level. 
b. Cash flow and change in sales are expressed as a ratio to the capital stock in the previous period. 
c. The crisis dummy variable equals 1 for the years 1995-97 in column 12-1 and for the years 1995-98 in column 12-2. The nonexporter dummy 
variable equals 1 if the firm does not export. 
 
5.  Capital Flows 
During the last two decades, capital inflows to MECs have increased enormously, and so has the importance 
of private flows (figure 21). In the average MEC the share of private flows has increased from 60 percent in the mid-1980s 
to more than 90 percent by the end of the 1990s. In Mexico these shares are 40 and 80 percent, respectively.  
Mexico falls in the midrange of MECs in terms of capital inflows. Between 1980 and 1999 net capital inflows 
to Mexico were on average equivalent to 3.3 percent of GDP (rising to 4.3 percent after liberalization). This is a 
remarkably high number, given that Mexico liberalized only in 1989 and experienced a crisis in 1994. During the same 
period the comparable ratio for Korea was 2 percent (3 percent after liberalization), and that for Thailand was 3.9 percent 
(5.3 percent after liberalization). The ratio for Chile was 7.2 percent.  
FDI is considered a “good” form of capital inflow, whereas bank flows are considered “bad” because they are 
foreign loans to domestic banks. Such loans are risky because of the currency mismatch. In Mexico the share of bank flows 
peaked in 1994 at about 25 percent of cumulative capital inflows since 1980.
58 This share has been declining ever since 
(figure 22). In contrast, the share of FDI in cumulative capital inflows has increased gradually, from 35 percent in 1980 to 
57 percent in 2002, but at a faster pace after the tequila crisis. The impressive increase in FDI in the wake of the crisis can 
be considered one tangible effect of NAFTA. 
Several observers have noted that one reason why financial liberalization has led to financial fragility is that 
an important share of capital inflows takes the form of bank flows. Many have argued that the greater the share of inflows 
in the form of FDI and the lower the share of bank credit, the lower is financial fragility. To evaluate this argument we 
must keep in mind a key fact overlooked by the literature. 
 
Stylized fact 5.  The lion’s share of FDI is directed mostly to the T-sector or to financial institutions.   48
Figure 21: Capital Inflows  
























































































MEC, private MEC, average  
 
Note: The figures show the total accumulated financial inflows in Mill. US$. 
Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF. 
 
Figure 22: Components of Private Capital Inflows 
 

































Portfolio Flows in MECs FDI in MECs Bank Flows in MECs  
 
Source: IFS, IMF and Bank of Mexico 
Note: Banks include commercial and development banks 
 
This is illustrated in figure 23. Because the nonfinancial N-sector receives a small share of FDI, bank flows 
remain the main source of external finance for most N-sector firms. Since this group of firms is financially constrained, a 
reduction in risky bank flows and credit may mean that N-sector investment and growth will fall. As there are productive 
linkages throughout the economy, the unconstrained T-sector will also be negatively affected. Hence it is possible that the 
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net effect of banning risky bank flows is to reduce long-run GDP growth. Here again we see that, in the presence of credit 
market imperfections, a policy that reduces financial fragility can, as a by-product, lead to a fall in growth.
59 
 
Figure 23:  FDI by Sector  
 










































































































Note: 1993 there was a major FDI inflow due to the investment in telecoms. Note that FDI into small and medium 
firms in 1993 was also only 6.5%. 
 
 
b) FDI Originating in the USA in 1998  
 
  N  T  F 
All countries  0.260  0.275  0.465 
HECs  0.260  0.232  0.508 
MECs  0.265  0.416  0.319 
Mexico  0.154  0.592  0.255 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis 
                                                 
59 We do not analyze here how the new theories of FDI account for the stylized fact that the largest share of nonfinancial FDI is 
allocated to the T-sector. Vertical motives for FDI involve fragmentation of production across countries (Markusen, 2002). 
Horizontal motives for FDI imply that firms invest abroad when the gains from avoiding trade costs outweigh the costs of 
maintaining capacity in a foreign country. Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2003) test this theory using U.S. data and find that the 
least productive firms serve only the domestic market, that relatively more productive firms export, and that the most 
productive firms engage in FDI. A third theory, based on the role of information in driving FDI, might also help account for this 
fact (Mody, Razin, and Sadka, 2003). 
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6.  Lessons and Conclusions 
 
We have shown that trade liberalization is typically followed by financial liberalization, which leads to lending 
booms and occasional financial crises. On net, however, both trade and financial liberalization have led to faster long-run 
growth across the set of countries with functioning financial markets. 
We have presented a model that establishes a causal link from liberalization to growth. Trade liberalization 
promotes efficiency and growth mainly in the tradables sector. Financial liberalization adds even more to growth because it 
eases financing constraints, leading to an increase in investment by financially constrained firms, most of which are in the 
nontradables sector. However, the easing of financing constraints takes place through the undertaking of credit risk, which leads 
to financial fragility and occasional crises. 
Mexico, a prominent liberalizer, failed to attain stellar GDP growth in the 1990s, and since 2001 its GDP and 
exports have stagnated. We have argued that this does not imply that liberalization is bad for growth. In fact, the benefits of 
liberalization can be seen in the extraordinary growth of exports and FDI during the 1990s. The key to the Mexican puzzle lies 
in the lack of structural reform after 1995 and in Mexico’s response to crisis: the credit crunch in Mexico has been far deeper 
and far more protracted than in the typical country. The credit crunch has hit the N-sector especially hard and has generated 
bottlenecks, which have contributed to the recent fall in exports. In sum, the lack of spectacular growth in Mexico cannot be 
blamed on wrongheaded reforms in the early 1990s, but on the lack of further judicial and structural reform after 1995.  
We conclude with a list of nine lessons that derive from the experience of countries with functioning financial 
markets, and of Mexico in particular. First, although several observers have claimed that financial liberalization is not good for 
growth because of the crises associated with it, this is the wrong lesson to draw. Our empirical analysis shows that, across 
countries with functioning financial markets, financial liberalization leads to faster average long-run growth, even though it also 
leads to occasional crises. This gain in growth is over and above the gain derived from trade liberalization.  
A second, closely related, lesson is that the growth-enhancing financial deepening that follows liberalization is not 
a smooth process. Rather, it takes place through boom-bust cycles. Occasional crises are the price that has to be paid to attain 
faster growth in the presence of severe contract enforceability problems. The first-best solution is to implement judicial reform 
and improve contract enforceability. In the absence of such reforms, liberalization permits financially constrained firms to 
attain greater leverage and invest more, at the cost of undertaking credit risk. Credit risk creates an environment of rapid growth 
and financial fragility. 
Third, to analyze the effects of liberalization it is not sufficient to look at aggregate data alone. Sectoral 
asymmetries play a key role: many tradables (T-) sector firms have access to international capital markets, whereas most 
nontradables (N-) sector firms are financially constrained and depend on banks for their financing. Trade liberalization and 
agreements such as NAFTA promote faster productivity growth in the T-sector but are of little direct help to the N-sector. 
Financial liberalization leads to an increase in international bank flows, which allows financially constrained firms to borrow 
more. Since many of these firms are in the N-sector, a currency mismatch on firms’ balance sheets develops, making the 
economy prone to self-fulfilling crises. In short, financial liberalization generates crises in countries with contract enforcement 
problems because financial liberalization is associated with international lending to the N-sector. 
We agree with the general view that FDI is the safest form of capital inflow. Our fourth lesson, however, is that 
FDI does not obviate the need for risky international bank flows. FDI goes mostly to T-sector firms and financial institutions. 
As a result, bank flows are practically the only source of external finance for most N-sector firms. Curtailing such risky flows   51
would reduce N-sector investment and generate bottlenecks that would limit long-run growth. Bank flows are hardly to be 
recommended, but for most firms it might be that or nothing. Clearly, allowing risky capital flows does not mean that anything 
goes. Appropriate prudential regulation must also be in place.  
Fifth, it is possible for GDP growth to recover rapidly from a crisis. Sustainable growth, however, cannot be 
assured unless the banking problem is fixed. Recovery in aggregate activity is typically not uniform across the economy. The 
tradables sector may grow strongly while the nontradables sector recuperates only sluggishly. This asymmetric response is 
intimately linked to a severe credit crunch that hits the N-sector particularly hard and that goes hand in hand with a steady 
increase in the share of nonperforming loans. The Mexican experience shows that NPLs are unlikely to disappear on their own, 
even if GDP growth resumes quickly. This raises the question of whether a policy under which all NPLs are recognized at once 
and the fiscal costs are all paid up front is preferable to a piecemeal policy. 
A sixth and somewhat conjectural lesson of the Mexican experience is that long-run growth cannot be based 
solely on export growth. Because the T-sector depends on N-sector inputs, it is necessary that the N-sector also grow in order to 
attain a balanced and sustainable growth path. This requires adequate financing for domestically oriented firms and structural 
reform in key sectors, such as energy. From the data up to June 2003 it can be cogently argued that if there is a lack of N-sector 
investment over a long period, a bottleneck effect will eventually set in and block export growth, as has been observed in 
Mexico since 2001.  
A seventh lesson is that crises are part of the growth process in financially liberalized countries with contract 
enforcement problems. At the “tipping point,” beyond which it is unlikely that capital outflows will reverse, authorities should 
focus on what to do after the crisis instead of attempting to forestall the crisis. Delaying an inevitable crisis will tend to make 
the effects of the full-blown crisis far worse, as attested by the experiences of Mexico in 1994 and Argentina in 2001. 
Finally, one can draw two lessons for empirical implementation. First,  stock market microlevel data sets are not 
representative of the economy as a whole and overemphasize the T-sector. This is demonstrated by comparing the Mexican 
stock market data base with the Mexican economic census, which includes all firms in the economy. Second, statistical variance 
is not a good instrument with which to identify financial fragility. Fragility is associated with infrequent but severe crises and 
therefore with both high variance and negative skewness. High variance, however, may reflect high-frequency shocks, which 
may be exogenous or self-inflicted, for instance by bad economic policy. Negative skewness tests specifically for infrequent 
crises. Our argument has shown that infrequent crises are a by-product of a rapid-growth path. 
 Appendix A
The Model
Here, we formalize the intuitive argument of Section 3 and show that it is indeed part of an internally
consistent story. The equilibrium will establish a causal link from …nancial liberalization to …nancial fragility,
and from the latter to credit and GDP growth. Also, it will impose restrictions on the sample of countries
over which the mechanism is operative, and on the behavior of credit and the N-to-T output ratio. The
model is based on Schneider and Tornell (2003), and Ranciere, Tornell and Westermann (2003).60
We consider a simple dynamic general equilibrium model of an economy with two sectors: a tradables (T)
sector that produces the consumption good, and a nontradables (N) sector that produces an intermediate
good which is used as an input in the production of both goods.57 As we shall see, the fact that the N-sector
demands its own goods is key for …nancial fragility to arise in equilibrium. The assumption that T-production
uses N-inputs is key to generate the bottleneck e¤ect and to link …nancial fragility to higher GDP growth.58
We will denote the relative price of N-goods (i.e., the inverse of the real exchange rate) by pt = pN
t =pT
t :59
T-goods are produced using a nontradable input (dt) according to yt = atd®
t ; with ® 2 (0;1): In any
equilibrium it follows that T-output and the T-sector demand for N-goods are, respectively:
yt = atd®







N-goods are produced using N-goods as inputs (It) according to
qt+1 = µIt (5)
The investable funds of an N-…rm consist of the debt it issues (Bt) plus its cash ‡ow (wt): The …rm’s budget
constraint, in terms of T-goods, is thus
ptIt = wt +Bt (6)
In order to allow for the possibility of …nancial fragility we assume that there are two one-period debt
instruments. N-debt (bn
t ), that promises to repay in N-goods: pt+1(1+½n
t )bn
t ; and T-debt (bt) that promises
60The model combines elements of the …nancial accelerator framework (Bernanke, et. al. (2000)) with elements of third-
generation BoP crises models. See for instance, Aghion, et.al. (2000), Burnside, et.al. (2000), Caballero and Krishnamurthy
(1999), Calvo (1998), Chang and Velasco (1998), Corsetti, et.al. (1999), Krugman (1999), Mckinnon and Pill (1998), and Tirole
(2002).
57The assumption that N-goods are demanded by the N-sector is necessary to get …nancial fragility in equilibrium. The
assumption that T-production uses N-inputs will allows us to formalize the bottleneck e¤ect and to link …nancial fragility to
higher GDP growth.
58Since the economy is small and open, the destination of T-goods is not important for our argument.
59Betts and Kehoe (2001) …nd that in a set of 52 countries over the period 1980-2000 real exchange rate variations re‡ect
mainly changes in the relative price of N and T goods, not movements in the international relative prices of T-goods. Among
some developed countries the latter channel is more important (Engel (1999)).
52to repay in T-goods: (1 + ½t)bt. We can interpret T(N)-debt as foreign(domestic) currency denominated
debt. As we shall see, the price may take two values in equilibrium. Since …rms produce N-goods, N-debt is
a perfect hedge, while T-debt may be risky.
In modeling the N-sector we will make two assumptions to capture key features of MECs discussed in
Section 3. First, N-sector …nancing is subject to contract enforceability problems. Second, there are systemic
bailout guarantees that cover lenders against systemic meltdowns.60 We follow Schneider and Tornell (2003)
and model the contract enforceability problem by assuming that …rms are run by dynasties of two-period
lived managers that cannot commit to repay debt: if at time t the young manager incurs a non-pecuniary
cost h[wt+Bt]; then at t+1 she will be able to divert all the returns provided the …rm is solvent.61 Lenders
only …nance plans that do not lead to diversion. Thus, when deciding whether to lend they take into account
that the goal of every manager is to maximize next period’s expected pro…ts net of diversion costs.
The …rm is solvent next period if revenues qt+1pt+1 are no lower than the promised debt repayment
Lt+1 plus the young manager’s wage (1¡¯)pt+1qt+1: In this case the old manager distributes the remaining
pro…ts, ¼t+1 = ¯qt+1pt+1 ¡ Lt+1; as a dividend to herself. To capture the costs of …nancial meltdowns we
assume that under insolvency a large share 1 ¡ ¹w of revenues are dissipated, the young manager gets a
small amount of seed money ¹wpt+1qt+1; with ¹w < 1¡¯; and the old manager gets zero. Lenders get Lt+1
if a bailout is granted and zero otherwise. Since guarantees are systemic, bailouts are paid out if and only
if many borrowers go bust. For concreteness, we assume that there is a bailout agency that repays lenders
100% of what they were promised (Lt) if a majority of borrowers goes bust.62
To close the description of the economy we note that the real exchange rate is determined by the N-goods
market clearing condition
dt(pt) + It(pt) = qt(It¡1) (7)
Since there are no exogenous shocks, the only source of risk is endogenous real exchange rate variability. As
we shall see, there are equilibria where (7) holds at two values of pt: ¹ pt+1 if …rms are solvent or p
t+1 if they
are insolvent.63
Trade and …nancial liberalization will mean a reduction in impediments to trade goods and assets, rather
than a shift away from autarky. In a …nancially non-liberalized economy there are regulations that preclude
agents from taking on credit risk that might lead to insolvency. Since the only source of risk is real exchange
60Recall the distinction between unconditional and systemic guarantees we made earlier. If all debt were covered by uncon-
ditional bailout guarantees, then the enforceability problem would become irrelevant and borrowing constraints would not arise
in equilibrium.
61We can think of N-…rms as banks that lend to the N-sector. This captures the fact that in MECs banks are heavily exposed
to the N-sector. The banking system is the channel through which capital in‡ows reach the N-sector and also is the weak link
during crises.
62Here we do not analyse how the cost of the subsidy implicit in the guarantees is paid for. This cost could be …nanced by
domestic taxation if we assumed that T-goods were produced using a …xed factor. In this case the cost of the subsidy would
be paid for by taxing this …xed factor. This is done by Ranciere, et.al. (2003).
63There are multiple self-ful…lling equilibria as in Cole and Kehoe (2000) and Obstfeld (1986).
53rate variability, this is equivalent to allowing agents to issue only N-debt. Financial liberalization eliminates
these regulations, so agents can issue both types of debt. As we shall see, liberalization will lead to currency
mismatch and lending booms that end in busts. The e¤ects of trade liberalization are not the focus of the
model. Since these reforms typically increase T-sector e¢ciency, they can be represented by an increase in
the productivity parameter at in (4). To isolate the e¤ects of …nancial liberalization we will set at to one.64
Financing and Investment Decisions. Consider …rst a non-liberalized economy. Since lenders
are risk neutral and the opportunity cost of capital is 1 + r; the interest rate that they require satis…es
[1+½n
t ]Et(pt+1) = 1+r: Furthermore, to avoid diversion by the …rm, lenders impose a borrowing constraint:
(1 + r)bn
t · h(wt + bn
t ): If investment yields a return which is higher than the opportunity cost of capital,
the …rm will borrow up to an amount that makes the credit constraint binding. Thus, budget constraint (6)
implies that credit and investment are:
bn
t = [ms ¡ 1]wt It = mswt
pt







Notice that a necessary condition for borrowing constraints to arise is h < 1 + r: If h; the index of contract
enforceability, were greater than the cost of capital, it would always be cheaper to repay debt rather than
to divert. Thus, lenders will not impose a ceiling on the amount they are willing to lend and agents will not
be …nancially constrained. This is why in the empirical part we di¤erentiate high-h from low-h countries.
Consider now a liberalized economy. Firms can now choose between N- and T-debt. If there is enough real
exchange rate variability, T-debt is risky and it might lead to insolvency: ¼(p
t+1) = ¯p
t+1qt+1¡(1+½t)bt < 0:
A …rm might choose T-debt and risk insolvency because risky T-debt is cheaper than safe N-debt. To see
why suppose for a moment that tomorrow’s real exchange rate can take on two values. With probability u
it takes an appreciated value (¹ pt+1) that leaves every …rm solvent, while with probability 1 ¡ u it takes a
depreciated value (p
t+1) that makes all N-sector …rms go bust and generates a crisis. Since lenders constrain
credit to ensure that borrowers will repay in the no-crisis state, it follows that in the no-crisis state debt
is repaid in full and there is no bailout. Meanwhile, in the crisis state there is bankruptcy and each lender
receives a bailout equal to what he was promised. Thus, the interest rate on T-debt is 1 +½t = 1+ r; while




: It follows that choosing T-debt over N-debt reduces the cost of
capital from 1 + r to [1 + r]u. Lower expected debt repayments, in turn, ease the borrowing constraint as
lenders will lend up to an amount that equates u[1+r]bt to h[wt +bt]: Therefore, credit and investment are:






64Clearly, in the real world …nancial liberalization opens the possibility for agents to take on credit risk in many other ways
than by just allowing them to choose a risky debt instrument. Here, we capture this in a parsimonious way that allows us
to obtain closed-form solutions, which in turn allows us to make clear why in an economy with credit market imperfections
…nancial liberalization leads to higher growth only if it leads to fragility.
54By comparing (9) with (8) we can see that:
Result 1. In the presence of systemic bailout guarantees, risky currency mismatch allows agents to reduce
the expected value of debt repayments, which eases borrowing constraints and increases the investment
multiplier: mr > ms:
This increase in leverage is possible because systemic guarantees mean that in a crisis lenders expect to
be bailed out. The fact that T-debt is cheaper than N-debt does not imply that agents will always be willing
to issue T-debt. This is because with probability 1¡u T-debt will result in bankruptcy for a borrower. One












This condition ensures that in the good state returns are high enough to make the production of N-goods
pro…table, and that in the bad state there is a critical mass of insolvencies so that lenders will be bailed
out.65 Next, we investigate when it is that currency mismatch generates price sequences that satisfy (10).
Equilibria. In the two economies we have considered investment is given by It = mt
wt
pt and and cash
‡ow equals the representative manager’s wage: wt = (1¡¯t)ptqt; where ¯t equals ¯ under solvency and ¹w
under insolvency. Thus, the market clearing condition (7) implies that in any equilibrium
It = Átqt; Át = [1 ¡¯t]mt; (11)
where the investment multiplier mt can take the value ms or mr: Combining (11) with (4) and (5) we have
that in a symmetric equilibrium N-output, prices and T-output evolve according to
qt = µÁt¡1qt¡1 (12a)
pt = ®[qt(1 ¡Át)]
®¡1 (12b)









1¡h± during every period. Thus, there exists an equilibrium in such an economy if and only if: (i)
the degree of contract enforceability satis…es h < ¹ h = ¯±
¡1; so that Át is less than one; and (ii) N-sector’s
productivity satis…es µ > µ = [±¯(Á





In a liberalized economy there are two equilibria. The safe one we have just characterized, where agents
65For a derivation of this result see Schneider and Tornell (2003).
55choose not to issue T-debt. There is also a risky equilibrium that is composed of lucky paths which are
punctuated by crises. Along a lucky path of this equilibrium all debt is denominated in T-goods and lenders
will be bailed out in the next period if a majority of …rms goes bust. Since the debt burden is not indexed to
pt; there are two market clearing prices. At the high price …rms are solvent and their cash ‡ow is [1¡¯]¹ ptqt.
Thus, Át = (1 ¡ ¯)mr: However, at the low price N-…rms are insolvent and their cash ‡ow is only ¹wp
tqt:
Moreover, it can be shown that when pt = p
t; leverage is too low for fragility to arise and the real exchange
rate to take on two values at t + 1: Thus, at the time of the crisis agents …nd optimal to issue N-debt and
the investment share is Át = ¹wms:
Resumption of risk taking takes place in the period after the crisis. Therefore, the path of N-sector
investment is












if pt = ¹ pt+1
if pt = p
t+1
(13)
The sequence fqt;pt;ytg is then determined by using (13) to replace Át in (12a)-(12c). One can show that
if crises are rare events there are thresholds for the degree of contract enforceability and for N-sector’s
productivity, such that if h 2 (h;¹ h) and µ 2 (µ;¹ µ) returns satisfy (10), and thus a risky equilibrium exists.
Notice that h < ¹ h and µ > µ ensure that when crises are rare events, investment is pro…table. Meanwhile,
µ < ¹ µ and h > h ensure that …rms with T-debt go bust in the bad state, and that the fall in cash ‡ow is
translated into a large fall in credit and N-investment, so that the fall in prices is validated. This establishes
the second result.
Result 2. Financial liberalization increases investment in the …nancially constrained sector, but only if it
makes the economy …nancially fragile and agents …nd it pro…table to take on credit risk. This occurs
only if the degree of contract enforceability satis…es h 2 (h;¹ h):
Notice that no exogenous shocks are necessary for crises, a shift in expectations is su¢cient. A crisis can
occur whenever …rms expect that others will not undertake credit risk, so that there is a reversion to the safe
equilibrium. The key to having multiple market clearing prices is that part of the N-sector’s demand comes
from the N-sector itself. Thus, when the price falls below a cuto¤ level and N-…rms go bust, the investment
share of the N-sector falls (from Á
l to Á
c): This, in turn, reduces the demand for N-goods, validating the fall
in the price.
We emphasize that the interaction of contract enforceability problems and systemic guarantees creates
the fragility required for self-ful…lling crises. If there were no guarantees, agents would not be willing to take
on credit risk to claim the implicit subsidy, and currency mismatch would not arise. Costly enforceability of
contracts would still imply that the N-sector can grow only gradually and balance sheet e¤ects would play
a role during the lending boom. However, there would be no endogenous force that makes a boom end in
a crisis. Alternatively, if there were only guarantees but no enforceability problems, then neither borrowing
56constraints nor balance sheet e¤ects would arise. Thus, N-sector investment would not depend on its cash
‡ow.
GDP Growth and Financial Fragility. We are now ready to rationalize the link between growth
and fragility. Since N-goods are intermediate inputs, while T-goods are …nal consumption goods, gross
domestic product equals the value of N-sector investment plus T-output: gdpt = ptIt + yt: It then follows
from (11)-(12c) that
gdpt = yt + ptÁtqt = q®





[1 ¡ Át]1¡® (14)
As we can see, the key determinants of the evolution of GDP are the technological coe¢cient in T-production
(at) and the share of N-output invested by the N-sector (Át). In order to isolate the e¤ects of …nancial
liberalization, we have set at to one.
In a non-liberalized economy the investment share Át is constant and equal to Á
s: Thus, GDP and











Absent technological progress in the T-sector, N-sector growth is the force driving growth in both sectors.
As the N-sector expands, N-goods become more abundant and cheaper allowing the T-sector to expand
production. This expansion is possible if and only if N-sector productivity (µ) and the N-investment share
(Á





A liberalized economy goesthrough a succession of lucky paths punctuated by crisis episodes. An economy
is on a lucky path at time t if there was no crisis either at t¡1 or at t. Since along a lucky path the investment
share equals Á






comparison of °l and (15) reveals that as long as a crisis does not occur, growth in a liberalized economy is
greater than in a non-liberalized one. In the presence of systemic guarantees, credit risk allows …nancially
constrained N-…rms to borrow and invest more than in a non-liberalized economy (Á
l > Á
s). Since there
are sectorial linkages (® > 0); this increase in the N-sector’s investment share bene…ts both the T- and the
N-sectors.




s, the fact that °l > °NL does not imply that …nancial liberalization leads to higher mean
GDP growth. The reduction in the investment share comes about through two channels: (i) N-sector …rms
66The mechanism by which higher growth in the N-sector induces higher growth in the T-sector is the decline in the relative
price of N-goods that takes place in a growing economy
pt+1
pt = [µÁs]®¡1: If there were technological progress in the T-sector,
there would be a Balassa-Samuelson e¤ect and the real exchange rate would appreciate over time.
57go bust and their cash ‡ow collapses (captured by
¹w
1¡¯); and (ii) leverage falls because …rms cannot take
on credit risk (indexed by 1¡h±
1¡h±u¡1). It follows from (14) that in a crisis episode that lasts two periods, the








: As we can see variations in GDP growth generated by real
exchange rate changes at ¿ and ¿ + 1 cancel out. Thus, the average loss in GDP growth stems only from
the fall in the N-sector’s average investment share.
A liberalized economy experiences several crises over time. Therefore, to see whether …nancial liberaliza-
tion will increase long-run growth, we compute the limit distribution of GDP’s growth rate. Using (??) and
(??), it follows that over the long run the mean compounded growth rate of GDP in a liberalized economy
is67










Notice that ! is the proportion of time that the economy is on a lucky path over the long-run. A comparison
of long run GDP growth rates in (15) and (16) reveals that:
Result 3. Average long-run GDP growth is greater in a liberalized economy than in a non-liberalized one
provided contract enforceability problems are severe, but not too severe (h 2 (h¤;h¤¤)); and …nancial
distress during crises is not too large (¹w > ¹w):
The relationship between …nancial liberalization and growth is not straightforward because an increase in
the probability of crisis (1¡u) has ambiguous e¤ects on long-run growth. One the one hand, a greater 1¡u
increases investment and growth along the lucky path by increasing the subsidy implicit in the guarantee and
allowing N-sector …rms to be more leveraged. On the other hand, a greater 1¡u makes crises more frequent.
The degree of contract enforceability h plays a key role. If we increase 1¡u, the growth enhancing e¤ect of
more investment dominates the growth reducing e¤ect of more frequent crises when h is large enough. This
is because a large h increases …rms’ leverage and allows them to reap the bene…ts of risk-taking. However,
h cannot be arbitrarily large to ensure the existence of an equilibrium. If h were very large, borrowing
constraints would not arise (by (9)), or there would not be market clearing, as Á
l > 1 (by (13)).68
The central role played by the requirement that “h must be low, but not too low” underlies the importance
of the country sample over which the empirical link between liberalization, and growth exists. The above
result implies that among the set of countries where contract enforceability problems are severe, but not too
severe, …nancial liberalization may lead to higher growth even if we control for trade liberalization. This
prediction establishes a causal link from liberalization to GDP growth in the regressions of Section 2.
67For the computation of the limit distribution see Ranciere, et.al. (2003).
68Higher long-run growth comes at the cost of a higher incidence of crises. A natural question is, thus, whether higher growth
is associated with higher social welfare. Ranciere et.al. (2003) show that if T-sector agents have access to complete capital
markets, so that they can hedge real exchange rate risk, then welfare in a risky equilibrium is greater than in a safe equilibrium
provided enforceability problems are severe enough.
58Credit Growth. Here we show that economies that have followed growth-enhancing risky credit paths
are identi…ed by a negatively skewed distribution of credit growth. Since in the model N-…rms use only
N-inputs, the appropriate measure of real credit is ~ bt = (bt + bn
t )=pt: It follows from (8) and (9) that in a







l ¡ (1 ¡¯)]qt
[Á
c ¡ ¹w]qt
if ¼(pt) ¸ 0
if ¼(pt) < 0
~ bNL
t = [Á
s ¡ (1 ¡¯)]qt (17)
In a safe non-liberalized economy credit follows a smooth path, while in a risky liberalized economy it follows
a bumpy path. Using (12a), we have that in the latter the compounded growth rate of credit is ³
l = log(µÁ
l)







1¡h± ) during a crisis and ³
p = log(µÁ
l 1
u) in the post-crisis period.
When skewness is negative, the good outcomes in the distribution lie closer to the mean than the bad
outcomes. We …nd this credit pattern in the risky equilibrium because N-…rms face endogenous borrowing
constraints, so N-sector credit is constrained by cash ‡ow. Along the lucky path –in which no crises occur–
cash ‡ow accumulates gradually, and credit can grow only gradually. In contrast, when a crisis erupts there
are widespread bankruptcies and cash ‡ow collapses. Thus, credit growth falls sharply (³
c < ³
l). In the
wake of a crisis credit growth rebounds before returning to its lucky level (³
p > ³
l). As long as crises
are rare events, the credit growth rates during the post-crisis period and the lucky path are very close
(³
p ¡ ³
l) = log(u¡1). Since falls and rebounds occur with the same frequency, the distribution of credit
growth is characterized by negative outliers in a long enough sample. That is
Result 4. In a risky liberalized economy the limit distribution of credit growth has negative skewness. Mean-
while, in a non-liberalized economy credit growth has a smooth path with zero skewness.
To link this result to our empirical …ndings recall that a risky equilibrium exists only if enforceability
problems are severe but not too severe, conditions which we …nd in MECs. Thus, the …rst implication of this
result is that …nancial liberalization may lead to bumpiness of credit growth across MECs. Since negative
skewness of credit growth implies the adoption of credit risk, which eases …nancial constraints and leads
to an increase in mean GDP growth (per result 3), the second implication is that negative skewness is an
appropriate RHS variable in the growth regressions we estimate.
Notice that if enforceability problems were either not severe or too severe, there would be no endogenous
force that would make credit growth negatively skewed to begin with. Thus, the link between negative skew-
ness and growth would not exist. This is why skewness is statistically signi…cantly in all growth regressions,
even if we do not condition on the sample of countries.
In the model, credit growth exhibits more variance in the liberalized economy. Empirically, however,
variance is not a good means of identifying economies that have followed growth-enhancing risky credit
59paths that lead to infrequent crises. High variance may also re‡ect high frequency shocks, which might be
exogenous or might be self-in‡icted by, for instance, bad economic policy. To generate high variance in both
the safe and the risky equilibria, one could include in the model high frequency exogenous shocks that do not
lead to crises. Such shocks would increase the variance of credit growth in both economies, but would not
increase mean GDP growth. The two equilibria would still be distinguished by negative skewness of credit
growth, because only the risky equilibrium would be crisis-prone.
The N-to-T Output Ratio. We have captured the sectorial asymmetry in …nancing opportunities
prevalent in MECs by assuming that T-production is not a¤ected by …nancial constraints, while the N-
sector faces contract enforceability problems. This sectorial asymmetry generates two predictions about the
behavior of the N-to-T output ratio (N/T) that help us identify the mechanism that links liberalization,
fragility and growth in MECs.
Since the N-sector is more …nancially constrained than the T-sector, the …rst prediction is that along any
equilibrium path N/T is positively correlated with domestic credit. To derive the second prediction note














Investment equations (8) and (9) imply that when there is a shift from a non-liberalized to a liberalized econ-
omy the N-to-T output ratio increases from ®
1¡Ás to ®
1¡Ál. This re‡ects the fact that …nancial liberalization
eases …nancial constraints and allows the N-sector to command a greater share of N-inputs.69
If a crisis occurs at some date, say ¿; there is a …re-sale: there is a steep real exchange rate depreciation,
and since there is currency mismatch, all N-…rms default. As a result, the investment share falls from Á
l
to Á
c: The price of N-goods must fall to allow the T-sector to absorb a greater share of N-output, which is
predetermined by ¿ ¡ 1 investment. As we can see in (18) N/T falls from ®
1¡Ál to ®
1¡Ác: Thus,
Result 5. Across MECs, the N-to-T output ratio: (i) responds positively to …nancial liberalization and
negatively to crises; and (ii) is positively correlated with credit growth.
Both of these implications of sectorial asymmetries are consistent with our empirical …ndings in Section 3.
Furthermore, sectorial asymmetries are key to explaining several features of the boom-bust cycles experienced
by many MECs, as well as Mexico’s less than stellar growth and recent export slowdown.
69We have set at to a constant. However, one can verify that an increase in at following trade liberalization reduces N/T.
60APPENDIX B 
Construction of Indexes, Data Sources, and Robustness Analysis 
 
Here we explain how we construct our liberalization indexes and the N-to-T output ratio, describe the data sets we 
used, and present results of some robustness tests. 
 
Liberalization Indexes 
Our de facto trade and financial liberalization indexes indicate the year when a given country liberalized. We 
construct the indexes by looking for trend breaks in trade and financial flows. We identify trend breaks by applying the 
CUSUM test of Brown and others (1975) to the time trend of the data. This method tests for parameter stability based on the 
cumulative sum of recursive residuals.
70 
A MEC is trade liberalized (TL) at year t if  its trade-to-GDP ratio either has a trend break at or before t or has 
exceeded 30 percent at or before t. The 30 percent criterion identifies countries where trade was liberalized at the beginning of 
our sample (1980) or where the increase in trade flows did not take place from one year to the next, but instead took place over 
a few years.
71 
To determine the date of financial liberalization, we consider net cumulative capital inflows (KI).
72 A country is 
financially liberalized (FL) at year t if  KI has a trend break at or before t and there is at least one year with a KI-to-GDP ratio 
greater than 5 percent at or before t, or if its KI-to-GDP ratio is greater than 10 percent at or before t, or if the country is 
associated with the European Union. The 5 and 10 percent thresholds reduce the possibility of false liberalization and false 
nonliberalization signals, respectively. Table B1 lists the liberalization dates. 
In order to determine the trend breaks, we regress each KI series on a constant and a time trend. The CUSUM test 
is based on the cumulative sum of residuals of this regression. Figure B1 plots this cumulative sum together with the 5 percent 
critical values for Mexico’s KI series. The test signals parameter instability of the time trend if the cumulative sum exits the 
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where wr is the recursive residual and s is the standard error of the regression fitted to all T-sample points. If the coefficient on 
the time trend remains constant from period to period, E(Wt) = 0. But if it changes, Wt will tend to diverge from the zero mean 
value line. The significance of any departure from the zero line is assessed by reference to a pair of 5 percent significance lines. 
The distance between them increases with t. The 5 percent significance lines are found by connecting the points k ± 0.948(T – 
k)
½ and T ± 3 ? 0.948(T – k)
½. A crossing of the critical lines by Wt signals coefficient instability.
73 
                                                 
70 All HECs have liberalized trade and financial markets through the whole sample period. 
71 We compute the trade-to-GDP ratio as the ratio of exports plus imports over GDP, using data from the World Development 
Indicators of the World Bank. 
72 We compute cumulative net capital inflows sent by nonresidents since 1980. Capital inflows include FDI, portfolio flows, 
and bank flows. The data series are from the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics, lines 78BUDZF, 
78BGDZF, and 78BEDZ. For some countries not all three series are available for all years. In that case we use inflows to the 
banking system only, a measure that is available for all country-years. 
73 The underlying assumption is that the time series is trend stationary before the structural break. This is confirmed for the case 
of Mexico by unit root tests. The unit root tests are estimated with a constant, a time trend, and a number of lags (2) determined   62
Table B1. Dates of Financial and Trade Liberalization and Sectors Used in N-to-T Output Ratios
a 
         
     
Sectors designated tradable and 
nontradable for regressions including 
the N-to-T output ratio
b 
Country 
Date of financial 
liberalization  
Date of trade 
liberalization 
Based on export 
shares 
Based on real 
exchange rates 
Argentina  1991  1986  C, M  C, M 
Bangladesh  Never  Never  S, M  S, M 
Belgium  Always  Always  C, M  C, M 
Brazil  1992  1988  S, M  S, M 
Chile  Always  Always  C, M  C, M 
 Colombia  1991  1992  S, M  S, M 
Egypt  Always  1991  S, M  S, M 
Greece  Always  1986  S, M  S, M 
Hong Kong  Always  Always  NA  NA 
Hungary  1994  1994  S, M  S, M 
India  Never  1994  S, M  S, M 
Indonesia
c  1989  1987  S, M  S, M 
Ireland  Always  Always  NA  NA 
Israel  1990  1986  NA  NA 
Jordan  1989  Always  S, M  S, M 
Korea  1985  Always  C, M  C, M 
Malaysia  Always  Always  C, M  C, M 
Mexico  1989  1988  C, M  C, M 
Morocco  Never  1986  S, M  S, M 
Pakistan  Never  Never  S, M  S, M 
Peru  1992  1987  M, S  S, M 
Philippines  1989  1986  C, M  C, M 
Poland  Never  1993  NA  S, M 
Portugal  1986  1986  C, M  C, M 
South Africa  1994  Never  S, M  S, M 
Spain  Always  1984  S, M  S, M 
Sri Lanka  Never  1989  S, M  S, M 
Thailand  1988  1986  C, M  C, M 
Tunisia  Never  Always  M, S  S, M 
Turkey  Always  1994  C, S  C, M 
Uruguay  1989  1988  NA  NA 
Venezuela  Never  Always  S, M  S, M 
Zimbabwe  Never  Never  S, M  S, M 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
a. “Always” indicates that the country has been open at least since 1980; “Never” indicates that the country was closed at least until 1999. 
b. The first of each pair is the sector designated as nontradable, and the second that designated as tradable; C, construction; M, manufacturing; S, 
services. 
c. The sample does not cover the period before 1993; the financial liberalization date is therefore set to 1989, which fits the dates of Kaminsky and 
Schmukler (2002) and Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2001). 
 
When the cumulative sum of residuals starts to deviate from zero, it may take a few years until this deviation 
becomes statistically significant. To account for the delay problem, we choose the year in which the cumulative sum of 
                                                                                                                                                          
by the SIC criterion. Before liberalization the series is trend stationary. Including the post liberalization period, it has a unit root 
and is difference stationary.   63
residuals deviates from zero, provided that it eventually crosses the 5 percent significance level. In the case of Mexico, 
parameter instability begins in the fourth quarter of 1989 and becomes statistically significant after the fourth quarter of 1991. 
Three comments are in order. First, our TL and FL indexes do not allow for policy reversals: once a country 
liberalizes, it never becomes closed thereafter. This means that our indexes do not capture some policy reversals that might 
have occurred in the latter part of the 1990s. Since our sample period is 1980-99, we consider our approach to be the correct 
one for analyzing the effects of liberalization on long-run growth and financial fragility.
74 Second, in comparing different 
indexes it is convenient to distinguish  liberalization  from  openness  indexes. The former  identify the  dates of financial 
liberalization, whereas the latter measure the amount of capital flows that a country receives over a certain period. For instance, 
Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2001) and Kaminski and Schmukler (2002) consider liberalization indexes as we do, whereas 
Kraay (1998), Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002), and Edison and others (2002) consider openness indexes. Finally, the country-
years identified as financially liberalized by our index, as well as the other liberalization indexes, do not necessarily coincide 
with “good times,” because they include both boom and bust country-years. Therefore they are not subject to the criticism that 
liberalized country-years coincide with good times. The liberalization dates are reported in table B1. 
 
The N-to-T Output Ratio 
We construct the N-to-T output ratio by proxying N-sector and T-sector production with data for construction, 
manufacturing, and services. In the text of the paper we use the sectoral exports-to-GDP ratio as the criterion for classifying the 
N- and T-sectors. Construction is never classified as a T-sector. Meanwhile the classification of services and manufacturing 
varies from country to country. Since the price of N-sector goods tracks international prices less closely than that of T-sector 
goods, we construct an alternative index in which we classify as nontradable the sectors in which the sectoral real exchange rate 
varies the most, and as tradable the sectors in which it varies the least. Table B1 reports both indexes. The correlation between 
them is 0.745. Table B2 shows that the regression results reported in table 4 are robust to the choice of index. 
 
Mexican Manufacturing Sector Data Set 
The data used to test for the presence of bottlenecks comes from the Annual Industrial Survey (Encuesta Industrial 
Annual) of the National Institute of Statistics, Geography, and Informatics (INEGI). In 1999 the sample contained 5,934 firms 
and covered more than 80 percent of manufacturing value added, 35 percent of employment, and 84 percent of sales in the 
manufacturing sector. The unit of observation is the manufacturing establishment. However, for confidentiality reasons we 
received the information at a five-digit aggregation level. To compute the share of N-sector inputs we consider the following as 
N-sector expenses: maintenance and repair services, outsourcing services, rents and leasing, transport, publicity, and electricity. 
The other expenses used to calculate total variable costs include labor costs, materials, technology transfers, commissions for 
sales, combustibles, and other expenses. 
                                                 
74 If, after liberalization, a country suffers a sharp reversal in capital flows (such as in a financial crisis), it might exhibit a 
second breakpoint. In our sample, however, this possibility is not present: the trend breaks due to crises are never large enough 
to show up in significant CUSUM test statistics.   64
Table B2. Regressions Testing for Sectoral Asymmetries
a  
 
Independent variable  B2-1  B2-2  B2-3 
Financial liberalization  1.129**  0.979**  0.996** 
  (0.142)  (0.149)  (0.141) 
Trade liberalization  -0.747**  -0.5618**  -0.772** 
  (0.191)  (0.198)  (0.203) 
Credit    0.479**  0.439** 
    (0.205)  (0.192) 
Rate of real depreciation      2.260* 
      (1.374) 
Crisis year dummy  -0.021*  -0.019*  0.003 
  (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.012) 
Crisis year +1  -2.444**  -2.134**  -2.240** 
  (0.144)  (0.184)  (0.178) 
Crisis year +2  0.207*  0.447**  0.375** 
  (0.128)  (0.155)  (0.147) 
Crisis year +3  -0.784**  -0.648**  -0.690** 
  (0.128)  (0.130)  (0.122) 
Crisis year +4  -0.478**  -0.236  0.341* 
  (0.194)  (0.204)  (0.194) 
Crisis year +5  0.856**  0.827**  0.911** 
  (0.184)  (0.163)  (0.155) 
       
Summary statistics:       
Adjusted R
2  0.691  0.728  0.745 
No. of observations  443  426  371 
Source: Authors’ regressions. 
a. Equation 3 in the text is estimated using panel data and generalized least squares; the dependent variable is the N-to-T output index based on the 
variance of the sectoral real exchange rate. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. * indicates significance at the 10 percent level, ** at the 5 
percent level. 
 
Mexican Economic Census  
The economic census covers the whole Mexican economy and is available at five-year intervals from INEGI. The 
information at the establishment level is confidential. Thus each observation corresponds to a group of establishments with a 
similar number of employees, in the same economic activity (six-digit classification) and in the same geographical region 
(municipality).
75 The number of establishments is omitted for some observations. In such cases an average of the number of 
establishments by group is used in order to weight each. There are 286,866 observations in 1994 and 400,120 in 1999. 
 
Mexican Stock Market (BMV) Data Set  
The stock market data set is derived from the information contained in the financial statements of firms listed on 
the Bolsa Mexicana de Valores. It is an unbalanced panel of 310 firms, excluding financial firms, of which only 64 are present 
for the whole sample period. We have yearly observations from 1990 to 2000. All the variables are measured at the end of the 
year and are deflated by the December consumer price index. The variables used in the text are constructed as in the 
accompanying table. 
                                                 
75 Within each six-digit class and each municipality, establishments were grouped according to the following stratification: 0-2 
employees, 3-5, 6-10, 11-15, 16-20, 21-30, 31-50, 51-100, 101-250, 251-500, 501-1,000, and 1,001 or more.    65
 
Variable  Definition 
Issuance  Total value of equity plus long-term bonds issued domestically and internationally. 
Long-term bonds are those with maturities of one year or longer. Issuances are 
normalized with the sum of long-term liabilities plus the stock outstanding. 
Entries/listed firms  Number of new firms or firms issuing initial public offerings divided by the total 
number of listed firms 
Exits/listed firms  Number of firms de-listing divided by the total number of listed firms 
Foreign liabilities/total 
liabilities 
Liabilities denominated in foreign currency, divided by total liabilities 
Capital stock  Fixed assets, including real estate, machinery, and equipment 
Investment  Change in fixed assets from year t -1 to year t 
Cash flow  Total sales minus operating expenses 
Change in sales  Change in total sales from year t - 1 to year t  
 
Robustness Tests 
Table B3 shows results of tests of the robustness of the benchmark regressions in columns 1-3 and 3-2 in tables 1 and 3, 
respectively. 
 
Table B3. Robustness Tests 
Independent variable  B3-1
a  B3-2
b  B3-3
 c  B3-4
 d  B3-5
 e 
Regressions of growth on liberalization
 f       
Financial liberalization  2.980**  3.036**  1.571**  2.686**  2.467** 
  (0.363)  (0.668)  (0.181)  (0.132)  (0.119) 
           
Summary statistics:           
Adjusted R
2  0.615  0.615  0.953  0.547  0.568 
No.  of observations  423  423  460  450  450 
           
Regressions of growth on bumpiness measures
 g       
0.051**  0.130**  0.065**  0.123**  0.127**  Mean of real credit 
growth rate  (0.010)  (0.019)  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.009) 
-0.027**  -0.030**  -0.001  -0.027**  -0.032**  Standard deviation of 
real credit growth rate  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
0.354**  0.212**  0.066**  0.207**  0.216**  Negative skewness of 
real credit growth rate  (0.071)  (0.097)  (0.025)  (0.036)  (0.037) 
           
Summary statistics:           
Adjusted R
2  0.617  0.619  0.901  0.562  0.630 
No.  of observations  383  383  424  414  414 
Source: Authors’ regressions. 
a. Instrumental variables regression estimated by two-stage least squares, using the legal origin index of La Porta and others (1999) as an instrument. 
All regressions include the combined MEC and HEC sample of countries. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ** indicates significance at 
the 5 percent level. 
b. Instrumental variables regression estimated by two-stage least squares, using lagged values as instruments. 
c. Regression estimated by the generalized least squares methods allowing for fixed effects. 
d. Regression estimated with a common intercept, but leaving out China. 
e. Regression estimated with a common intercept, but leaving out Ireland. 
f. Regressions correspond to that reported in column 1-3 in the text. 
g. Regressions correspond to that reported in column 3-2 in the text.   66
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